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Message-ID: <557ECBC5.7000705@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 08:57:41 -0400
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
CC: linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, drquigl <drquigl@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/7] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file
On 06/12/2015 11:30 AM, David Howells wrote:
> Hi Stephen,
>
> David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
>
>> Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>>
>>> Also, would be good to create a common helper for use here, by
>>> selinux_dentry_init_security(), selinux_inode_init_security(), and
>>> may_create(). Already some seeming potential for inconsistencies there.
>>
>> selinux_dentry_init_security() and selinux_inode_init_security() do
>> something different depending on SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT. Is the dentry
>> variant wrong? Shouldn't it be using the mountpoint label if that flag _is_
>> set?
>
> Any answer to that?
It looks like commit 415103f9932d45f7927f4b17e3a9a13834cdb9a1 changed
selinux_inode_init_security()'s handling of SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT,
and this change was never propagated to selinux_dentry_init_security().
However, that commit also did not update
security/selinux/hooks.c:may_create()'s logic for computing the new file
label when checking CREATE permission, and therefore introduced a
potential inconsistency between the label used for the permission check
and the label assigned to the inode.
That's why I suggested that we need a common helper for all three to
ensure consistency there.
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