[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <32052.1434447696@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 10:41:36 +0100
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, drquigl <drquigl@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/7] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> It looks like commit 415103f9932d45f7927f4b17e3a9a13834cdb9a1 changed
> selinux_inode_init_security()'s handling of SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT,
> and this change was never propagated to selinux_dentry_init_security().
> However, that commit also did not update
> security/selinux/hooks.c:may_create()'s logic for computing the new file
> label when checking CREATE permission, and therefore introduced a
> potential inconsistency between the label used for the permission check
> and the label assigned to the inode.
>
> That's why I suggested that we need a common helper for all three to
> ensure consistency there.
Ah, okay. I didn't realise selinux_dentry_init_security() wasn't supposed to
be so different.
David
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists