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Message-ID: <20150629064243.GB16251@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2015 08:42:43 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@....eng.br>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
Dasaratharaman Chandramouli
<dasaratharaman.chandramouli@...el.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86, msr: Allow read access to /dev/cpu/X/msr
* Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@....eng.br> wrote:
> On Sun, 28 Jun 2015, Prarit Bhargava wrote:
>
> > Is it easier to blacklist MSRs we don't want generally exposed, or only expose
> > the ones that we think are safe? That's sort of a devil's advocate sort of
> > question ;) and I'm wondering what the shorter list is.
>
> The only way to make MSR access safe is to allow it only by whitelisting. The
> x86 platform restricts all MSR access to ring 0 for a damn good reason.
Exactly.
We also want to document them along the way: just exposing all doesn't achieve
that.
> Also, such a whitelist would most likely need to be vendor and model-aware, and
> to differentiate "allow reads" from "allow writes"...
Initially it should only allow reads - which I believe fully meets turbostat's
needs.
Thanks,
Ingo
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