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Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 10:12:21 +0100
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: jmorris@...ei.org, mcgrof@...il.com, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures
On Mon, 2015-07-27 at 23:43 +0100, David Howells wrote:
>
> PKCS#7: Require authenticated attributes
>
> Require there to be authenticated attributes in the PKCS#7/CMS message so
> that an attacker can't drop them to provide greater opportunity for
> manipulating the message.
There doesn't seem to be a lot of point in this part. If the
authenticated attribute isn't being *checked*, then the attacker
doesn't need to drop it at all. There's no point in merely requiring
its *existence*.
As part of the firmware signatures, if we are asked to check the
filename then yes we should require it to be present *and* match. But
if we aren't checking (which we can't for modules since we don't know
what's being loaded), why require it to be present at all?
--
David Woodhouse Open Source Technology Centre
David.Woodhouse@...el.com Intel Corporation
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