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Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2015 22:06:15 +0300 From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com> To: zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...wei.com>, <stable@...r.kernel.org> Subject: [PATCH 1/1] integrity: prevent loading untrusted certificates to IMA trusted keyring If IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled either directly or indirectly via IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, it enables certificate loading to the IMA trusted keyring from the kernel. Due to the overlook, KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED was used in the key_create_or_update() to create keys within the kernel, which caused overriding certificate verification result and allowed to load self-signed or wrongly signed certificates. This patch just removes this option. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...wei.com> Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org> # 3.19+ --- security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 36fb6b5..5be9ffb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) rc, ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); if (IS_ERR(key)) { rc = PTR_ERR(key); pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate (%d): %s\n", -- 2.1.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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