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Message-ID: <CACE9dm9h=pVJLaSZdyCf1FD4hvdS9N3LjVx7DtGFyEo5AKSJEw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2015 23:08:46 +0300
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...wei.com>,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] integrity: prevent loading untrusted certificates to
IMA trusted keyring
Hi,
Apply this patch, please...
Dmitry
On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 10:06 PM, Dmitry Kasatkin
<dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com> wrote:
> If IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled either directly or indirectly via
> IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, it enables certificate loading to the IMA trusted
> keyring from the kernel. Due to the overlook, KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED was used in the
> key_create_or_update() to create keys within the kernel, which caused
> overriding certificate verification result and allowed to load self-signed or
> wrongly signed certificates.
>
> This patch just removes this option.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...wei.com>
> Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org> # 3.19+
> ---
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> index 36fb6b5..5be9ffb 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
> rc,
> ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
> KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
> - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
> + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
> if (IS_ERR(key)) {
> rc = PTR_ERR(key);
> pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate (%d): %s\n",
> --
> 2.1.4
>
--
Thanks,
Dmitry
--
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