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Message-ID: <5614F532.2070907@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 07 Oct 2015 12:34:26 +0200
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@...onical.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6] seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters
On 10/07/2015 12:25 PM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 10/07/2015 11:46 AM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>> This patch adds support for dumping a process' (classic BPF) seccomp
>> filters via ptrace.
>>
>> PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER allows the tracer to dump the user's classic BPF
>> seccomp filters. addr should be an integer which represents the ith seccomp
>> filter (0 is the most recently installed filter). data should be a struct
>> sock_filter * with enough room for the ith filter, or NULL, in which case
>> the filter is not saved. The return value for this command is the number of
>> BPF instructions the program represents, or negative in the case of errors.
>> A command specific error is ENOENT, which indicates that there is no ith
>> filter in this seccomp tree.
>>
>> A caveat with this approach is that there is no way to get explicitly at
>> the heirarchy of seccomp filters, and users need to memcmp() filters to
>> decide which are inherited. This means that a task which installs two of
>> the same filter can potentially confuse users of this interface.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@...onical.com>
>> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> CC: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
>> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
>> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>> CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>
>> CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>
>> CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
>> CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
>> ---
>> include/linux/seccomp.h | 11 +++++++++
>> include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h | 2 ++
>> kernel/ptrace.c | 5 ++++
>> kernel/seccomp.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> 4 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
>> index f426503..8861b5b 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
>> @@ -95,4 +95,15 @@ static inline void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
>> return;
>> }
>> #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
>> +
>> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
>> +extern long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, long n,
>> + void __user *data);
>> +#else
>> +static inline long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task,
>> + long n, void __user *data)
>> +{
>> + return -EINVAL;
>
> Nit: -ENOTSUP would probably be the better choice? -EINVAL might just
> be confusing to users? (Would be unclear to them whether there's actual
> support of dumping or whether it's just an invalid argument.)
>
>> +}
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER && CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */
>> #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
> ...
>> diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
>> index 787320d..b760bae 100644
>> --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
>> +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
>> @@ -1016,6 +1016,11 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request,
>> break;
>> }
>> #endif
>> +
>> + case PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER:
>> + ret = seccomp_get_filter(child, addr, datavp);
>> + break;
>> +
>> default:
>> break;
>> }
>> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> index 06858a7..c8a4564 100644
>> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
>> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> @@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
>> {
>> struct seccomp_filter *sfilter;
>> int ret;
>> + bool save_orig = config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE);
>>
>> if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
>> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>> @@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
>> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>>
>> ret = bpf_prog_create_from_user(&sfilter->prog, fprog,
>> - seccomp_check_filter, false);
>> + seccomp_check_filter, save_orig);
>> if (ret < 0) {
>> kfree(sfilter);
>> return ERR_PTR(ret);
>> @@ -867,3 +868,57 @@ long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
>> /* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */
>> return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs);
>> }
>> +
>> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
>> +long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, long n, void __user *data)
>> +{
>> + struct seccomp_filter *filter;
>> + struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog;
>> + long ret;
>> +
>> + if (n < 0)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>
> I would probably give 'n' a better name, maybe 'filter_off' to denote an
> offset in the task's filter list?
>
> So, it's called as seccomp_get_filter(child, addr, datavp), and addr is
> an unsigned long in ptrace_request(). Any reasons why making this 'long n'
> with adding this above check?
>
>> + spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
>> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
>
> The capability check should probably happen before taking the task's spinlock.
>
>> + current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) {
Should this rather be: current->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ?
So that you bail out when seccomp is not in use?
>> + ret = -EACCES;
>> + goto out_self;
>> + }
>> +
>> + spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
>> + if (task->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER) {
>> + ret = -EINVAL;
>> + goto out_task;
>> + }
>> +
>> + filter = task->seccomp.filter;
>> + while (n > 0 && filter) {
>> + filter = filter->prev;
>> + n--;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (!filter) {
>> + ret = -ENOENT;
>> + goto out_task;
>> + }
>> +
>> + fprog = filter->prog->orig_prog;
>
> You could add this check ...
>
> https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/davem/net.git/commit/?id=93d08b6966cf730ea669d4d98f43627597077153
>
> ... here as well, so we don't get surprises in future. ;)
>
>> + ret = fprog->len;
>> + if (!data)
>> + goto out_task;
>> +
>> + if (copy_to_user(data, fprog->filter, bpf_classic_proglen(fprog))) {
>> + ret = -EFAULT;
>> + goto out_task;
>> + }
>> +
>> +out_task:
>> + spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
>> +
>> +out_self:
>> + spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +#endif
>>
>
--
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