[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20151007103704.GA2547@hopstrocity>
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2015 11:37:04 +0100
From: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@...onical.com>
To: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6] seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp
filters
Hi Daniel,
On Wed, Oct 07, 2015 at 12:25:39PM +0200, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 10/07/2015 11:46 AM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> >+
> >+#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
> >+extern long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, long n,
> >+ void __user *data);
> >+#else
> >+static inline long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task,
> >+ long n, void __user *data)
> >+{
> >+ return -EINVAL;
>
> Nit: -ENOTSUP would probably be the better choice? -EINVAL might just
> be confusing to users? (Would be unclear to them whether there's actual
> support of dumping or whether it's just an invalid argument.)
Fine with me, the rest of the seccomp functions in this file use
-EINVAL, so I'm just copying that. Kees?
> >+}
> >+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER && CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */
> > #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
> ...
> >diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> >index 787320d..b760bae 100644
> >--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> >+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> >@@ -1016,6 +1016,11 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request,
> > break;
> > }
> > #endif
> >+
> >+ case PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER:
> >+ ret = seccomp_get_filter(child, addr, datavp);
> >+ break;
> >+
> > default:
> > break;
> > }
> >diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> >index 06858a7..c8a4564 100644
> >--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> >+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> >@@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
> > {
> > struct seccomp_filter *sfilter;
> > int ret;
> >+ bool save_orig = config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE);
> >
> > if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
> > return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> >@@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
> > return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> >
> > ret = bpf_prog_create_from_user(&sfilter->prog, fprog,
> >- seccomp_check_filter, false);
> >+ seccomp_check_filter, save_orig);
> > if (ret < 0) {
> > kfree(sfilter);
> > return ERR_PTR(ret);
> >@@ -867,3 +868,57 @@ long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
> > /* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */
> > return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs);
> > }
> >+
> >+#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
> >+long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, long n, void __user *data)
> >+{
> >+ struct seccomp_filter *filter;
> >+ struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog;
> >+ long ret;
> >+
> >+ if (n < 0)
> >+ return -EINVAL;
>
> I would probably give 'n' a better name, maybe 'filter_off' to denote an
> offset in the task's filter list?
Ok, I can make that change.
> So, it's called as seccomp_get_filter(child, addr, datavp), and addr is
> an unsigned long in ptrace_request(). Any reasons why making this 'long n'
> with adding this above check?
No, I think just an oversight; I'll switch it to unsigned.
> >+ spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
> >+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
>
> The capability check should probably happen before taking the task's spinlock.
We (probably) don't need the lock at all since we're just reading, but
seccomp_may_assign_mode() asserts that things are locked before it
checks current->seccomp.mode, so I lock here as well (and that's the
only reason to lock), so if we lock after, we don't need to lock at
all.
> >+ current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) {
> >+ ret = -EACCES;
> >+ goto out_self;
> >+ }
> >+
> >+ spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
> >+ if (task->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER) {
> >+ ret = -EINVAL;
> >+ goto out_task;
> >+ }
> >+
> >+ filter = task->seccomp.filter;
> >+ while (n > 0 && filter) {
> >+ filter = filter->prev;
> >+ n--;
> >+ }
> >+
> >+ if (!filter) {
> >+ ret = -ENOENT;
> >+ goto out_task;
> >+ }
> >+
> >+ fprog = filter->prog->orig_prog;
>
> You could add this check ...
>
> https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/davem/net.git/commit/?id=93d08b6966cf730ea669d4d98f43627597077153
>
> ... here as well, so we don't get surprises in future. ;)
Ok :). Then we need to bikeshed which error code, though. I proposed
EMEDIUMTYPE before, but I'm happy to use whatever.
Thanks for the review.
Tycho
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists