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Message-ID: <20151013173442.GB22160@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 11:34:42 -0600
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@...idianresearch.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: tpmdd-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
peterhuewe@....de, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, mjg59@...f.ucam.org,
Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@...horst.net>,
David Safford <safford@...ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
"open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] tpm: seal/unseal for TPM 2.0
On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 11:38:17AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Added tpm_trusted_seal() and tpm_trusted_unseal() API for sealing
> trusted keys.
>
> This patch implements basic sealing and unsealing functionality for
> TPM 2.0:
We really need to stop using chip id's as a handle - the caller should
be using a pointer, it is just a horrible API, and the TPM_ANY_NUM
business is awful too.. TPM's are stateful devices!
Is it feasible to introduce new APIs with a saner scheme?
The api layering also seems really weird to me. At a minimum the
tpm_seal_trusted should be called within key_seal, but really, should
key_seal be migrated into the TPM core? I'm not sure it makes alot of
sense to have a tpm_seal_trusted which uses the high level key structs
when other tpm functions are all low level RPC wrappers...
Jason
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