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Message-ID: <20151120001043.GA28204@www.outflux.net>
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 16:10:43 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...ux.intel.com>,
Shachar Raindel <raindel@...lanox.com>,
Boaz Harrosh <boaz@...xistor.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.cz>,
Haggai Eran <haggaie@...lanox.com>,
Theodore Tso <tytso@...gle.com>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
Dirk Steinmetz <public@...tdrjgfuzkfg.com>,
Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: [PATCH] fs: clear file set[ug]id when writing via mmap
Normally, when a user can modify a file that has setuid or setgid bits,
those bits are cleared when they are not the file owner or a member of the
group. This is enforced when using write() directly but not when writing
to a shared mmap on the file. This could allow the file writer to gain
privileges by changing the binary without losing the setuid/setgid bits.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
---
mm/memory.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index deb679c31f2a..4c970a4e0057 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -2036,6 +2036,7 @@ static inline int wp_page_reuse(struct mm_struct *mm,
if (!page_mkwrite)
file_update_time(vma->vm_file);
+ file_remove_privs(vma->vm_file);
}
return VM_FAULT_WRITE;
--
1.9.1
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
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