[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20160106170008.GF4603@localhost>
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2016 19:00:08 +0200
From: Petko Manolov <petkan@...-labs.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, dwmw2@...radead.org,
David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@...el.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] X.509: Don't check the signature on apparently
self-signed keys [ver #2]
On 16-01-06 13:21:27, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> > The x509_validate_trust() was originally added for IMA to ensure, on a
> > secure boot system, a certificate chain of trust rooted in hardware. The IMA
> > MOK keyring extends this certificate chain of trust to the running system.
>
> The problem is that because 'trusted' is a boolean, a key in the IMA MOK
> keyring will permit addition to the system keyring.
If this is true the i am clearly doing the wrong thing. The CA hierarchy should
run top-bottom, not the other way around.
IMA MOK was introduced mainly because .system keyring was static at the time.
Assuming i have my root certificate in .system how can i add more keys to this
keyring? The new keys have been signed by my root CA? Is this possible since
your October patch-set or i've been missing something this whole time?
Petko
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists