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Message-ID: <1452692714.88154.39.camel@infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 13:45:14 +0000
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tstruk@...il.com>, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
tadeusz.struk@...el.com, smueller@...onox.de,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, marcel@...tmann.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
peterhuewe@....de
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: AF_ALG - add support for keys/asymmetric-type
On Wed, 2016-01-13 at 13:36 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org> wrote:
>
> > David, is there a way to do that test purely in software without
> > needing hardware support? We know that the data might not actually be
> > present in all cases... is there an easy test for that case?
>
> I have written a user TPM driver that talks to a userspace TPM implementation
> out of the backend. It's been pushed to the TPM driver guy but I'm not sure
> what became of it. I'll chase it up.
I was thinking of something a lot simpler — like a test hack with a key
type that just puts a *pointer* to the key data in the 'payload', to
ensure that nobody is violating the rules about directly touching the
payload (which should be private to the implementation).
--
dwmw2
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