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Date:	Tue, 08 Mar 2016 13:08:36 +0000
From:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:	dhowells@...hat.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2]

Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> Only certificates signed by a key on the system keyring were added to
> the IMA keyring, unless IMA_MOK_KEYRING was configured.  Then, the
> certificate could be signed by a either a key on the system or ima_mok
> keyrings.  To replicate this behavior, the default behavior should be to
> only permit certificates signed by a key on the builtin keyring, unless
> this new Kconfig is enabled.  Only then, permit certificates signed by a
> key on either the builtin or secondary keyrings to be added to the IMA
> keyring.

How about I change it to a choice-type item, with the following options:

 (1) No addition.

 (2) Addition restricted by built-in keyring.

 (3) Addition restricted by secondary keyring + built-in keyring.

where the second and third options then depend on the appropriate keyrings
being enabled.

David

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