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Message-ID: <1457446364.5321.105.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2016 09:12:44 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings
instead of .ima_mok [ver #2]
On Tue, 2016-03-08 at 13:08 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> > Only certificates signed by a key on the system keyring were added to
> > the IMA keyring, unless IMA_MOK_KEYRING was configured. Then, the
> > certificate could be signed by a either a key on the system or ima_mok
> > keyrings. To replicate this behavior, the default behavior should be to
> > only permit certificates signed by a key on the builtin keyring, unless
> > this new Kconfig is enabled. Only then, permit certificates signed by a
> > key on either the builtin or secondary keyrings to be added to the IMA
> > keyring.
>
> How about I change it to a choice-type item, with the following options:
>
> (1) No addition.
>
> (2) Addition restricted by built-in keyring.
>
> (3) Addition restricted by secondary keyring + built-in keyring.
>
> where the second and third options then depend on the appropriate keyrings
> being enabled.
So option 1 is where IMA-appraisal is configured, but neither the
builtin nor the secondary keys are enabled. This would be the
equivalent of having a set of "builtin" keys loaded directly onto the
IMA keyring, without the ability of adding additional keys.
Ok, I'm fine this solution.
thanks,
Mimi
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