linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima

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Message-ID: <3362.1457453220@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date:	Tue, 08 Mar 2016 16:07:00 +0000
From:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To:	Petko Manolov <petkan@...-labs.com>
Cc:	dhowells@...hat.com, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2]

Petko Manolov <petkan@...-labs.com> wrote:

> > How about I change it to a choice-type item, with the following options:
> > 
> >  (1) No addition.
> > 
> >  (2) Addition restricted by built-in keyring.
> > 
> >  (3) Addition restricted by secondary keyring + built-in keyring.
> > 
> > where the second and third options then depend on the appropriate keyrings 
> > being enabled.
> 
> I would suggest leaving (1) and (3).  Since secondary keyring only accepts
> keys signed by certificate in the system keyring I think (2) is redundant.
> It adds extra complexity (Kconfig is vague enough already) while it doesn't
> increase the overall security by much.

If I remove option (2), that would mean that if you want to allow keys to be
added to .ima if they're signed by the built-in keyring, then you also allow
keys to be added to .ima if they're signed by the secondary keyring if
enabled.

Remember - these keyrings aren't necessarily restricted to IMA.

David