linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 6/7] vfio-pci: Allow to mmap MSI-X table if IOMMU_CAP_INTR

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Date:	Thu, 17 Mar 2016 19:32:44 +0800
From:	Yongji Xie <xyjxie@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
Cc:	kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-pci@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
	linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, bhelgaas@...gle.com, corbet@....net,
	aik@...abs.ru, benh@...nel.crashing.org, paulus@...ba.org,
	mpe@...erman.id.au, warrier@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
	zhong@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, nikunj@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
	Eric Auger <eric.auger@...aro.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 6/7] vfio-pci: Allow to mmap MSI-X table if
 IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP was set

On 2016/3/17 0:31, Alex Williamson wrote:
> [cc+ Eric, Will]
>
> On Mon,  7 Mar 2016 15:48:37 +0800
> Yongji Xie <xyjxie@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>
>> Current vfio-pci implementation disallows to mmap MSI-X
>> table in case that user get to touch this directly.
>>
>> But we should allow to mmap these MSI-X tables if IOMMU
>> supports interrupt remapping which can ensure that a
>> given pci device can only shoot the MSIs assigned for it.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yongji Xie <xyjxie@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
>> ---
>>   drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c      |    8 +++++---
>>   drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_rdwr.c |    4 +++-
>>   2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
>> index 49d7a69..d6f4788 100644
>> --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
>> @@ -592,13 +592,14 @@ static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data,
>>   			    IORESOURCE_MEM && !pci_resources_share_page(pdev,
>>   			    info.index)) {
>>   				info.flags |= VFIO_REGION_INFO_FLAG_MMAP;
>> -				if (info.index == vdev->msix_bar) {
>> +				if (!iommu_capable(pdev->dev.bus,
>> +					IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP) &&
>> +					info.index == vdev->msix_bar) {
> We only need to test the IOMMU capability if it's the msix BAR, so why
> test these in the reverse order?  It should be:
>
>                                      info.index == vdev->msix_bar &&
>                                      !iommu_capable(pdev->dev.bus,
>                                                     IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP)
>
> Same below.

OK. I'll fix it.

> I think we also have the problem that ARM SMMU is setting this
> capability when it's really not doing anything at all to provide
> interrupt isolation.  Adding Eric and Will to the Cc for comment.
>
> I slightly dislike using an IOMMU API interface here to determine if
> it's safe to allow user access to the MSIx vector table, but it seems
> like the best option we have at this point, if it's actually true for
> all the IOMMU drivers participating in the IOMMU API.
>
>>   					ret = msix_sparse_mmap_cap(vdev, &caps);
>>   					if (ret)
>>   						return ret;
>>   				}
>>   			}
>> -
>>   			break;
>>   		case VFIO_PCI_ROM_REGION_INDEX:
>>   		{
>> @@ -1029,7 +1030,8 @@ static int vfio_pci_mmap(void *device_data, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>>   	if (phys_len < PAGE_SIZE || req_start + req_len > phys_len)
>>   		return -EINVAL;
>>   
>> -	if (index == vdev->msix_bar) {
>> +	if (!iommu_capable(pdev->dev.bus, IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP) &&
>> +		index == vdev->msix_bar) {
>>   		/*
>>   		 * Disallow mmaps overlapping the MSI-X table; users don't
>>   		 * get to touch this directly.  We could find somewhere
>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_rdwr.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_rdwr.c
>> index 5ffd1d9..1c46c29 100644
>> --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_rdwr.c
>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_rdwr.c
>> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
>>   #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>>   #include <linux/io.h>
>>   #include <linux/vgaarb.h>
>> +#include <linux/iommu.h>
>>   
>>   #include "vfio_pci_private.h"
>>   
>> @@ -164,7 +165,8 @@ ssize_t vfio_pci_bar_rw(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, char __user *buf,
>>   	} else
>>   		io = vdev->barmap[bar];
>>   
>> -	if (bar == vdev->msix_bar) {
>> +	if (!iommu_capable(pdev->dev.bus, IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP) &&
>> +		bar == vdev->msix_bar) {
> Do we really want to test this on *every* read/write to any BAR (order
> of tests matter)?  Even in the case of the MSIx BAR, should we cache
> this when the device is first opened?

I will cache this in vfio_pci_open().

Thanks,
Yongji Xie