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Message-ID: <1459530445.2657.74.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 01 Apr 2016 13:07:25 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings
instead of .ima_mok [ver #3]
On Fri, 2016-04-01 at 15:06 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> > The three choice options I implemented don't exactly provide new features.
> > Firstly:
> >
> > config IMA_LOAD_X509
> >
> > allow keys to be loaded in at compile time,
>
> Ah - I think I'm labouring under a slight misapprehension here. IMA_LOAD_X509
> doesn't load keys at compile time, but rather the kernel loads a file by name
> when booting, right?
Right, all certificates must be signed by a key on the builtin (or
secondary keyring) before being added to the IMA keyring. Similarly,
dracut (modules/98integrity/ and systemd (ima-setup.c) have support for
loading signed certificates on the IMA keyring.
Mimi
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