linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions

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Message-ID: <20160426211951.45c7daa5@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Date:	Tue, 26 Apr 2016 21:19:51 +0100
From:	One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To:	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
	"open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" <devel@...verdev.osuosl.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions

> > Storing your ssh private key encrypted such that even someone who
> > completely compromises your system can't get the actual private key  
> 
> Well, if someone gets root on my system, he can get my ssh private
> key.... right?

Potentially not. If you are using a TPM or other TEE (such as SGX) they
can't because the authentication is done from within the TEE. They may be
able to hack your box and use the TEE to login somewhere but not to get
the key out.

Stopping the latter requires a TEE with its own secure input keypad (like
some of the USB dongles)

Other uses might be things like keeping a copy of the rpm database so you
can ask the TEE if the database you have right now happens to match the
one you signed as authentic. I suspect there are lots of interesting
things that can be done with dm_crypt and also IMA in this area too.

Alan