linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions

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Message-ID: <20160426215952.44ff82a6@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Date:	Tue, 26 Apr 2016 21:59:52 +0100
From:	One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To:	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
	"open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" <devel@...verdev.osuosl.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions

> But... that will mean that my ssh will need to be SGX-aware, and that
> I will not be able to switch to AMD machine in future. ... or to other
> Intel machine for that matter, right?

I'm not privy to AMD's CPU design plans.

However I think for the ssl/ssh case you'd use the same interfaces
currently available for plugging in TPMs and dongles. It's a solved
problem in the crypto libraries.

> What new syscalls would be needed for ssh to get all this support?

I don't see why you'd need new syscalls.

> Ookay... I guess I can get a fake Replay Protected Memory block, which
> will confirm that write happened and not do anything from China, but

It's not quite that simple because there are keys and a counter involved
but I am sure doable.

> And, again, it means that quite complex new kernel-user interface will
> be needed, right?

Why ? For user space we have perfectly good existing system calls, for
kernel space we have existing interfaces to the crypto and key layers for
modules to use.

Alan