linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20160426215236.GA1605@amd>
Date:	Tue, 26 Apr 2016 23:52:36 +0200
From:	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To:	One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
	"open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" <devel@...verdev.osuosl.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions

On Tue 2016-04-26 21:59:52, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> > But... that will mean that my ssh will need to be SGX-aware, and that
> > I will not be able to switch to AMD machine in future. ... or to other
> > Intel machine for that matter, right?
> 
> I'm not privy to AMD's CPU design plans.
> 
> However I think for the ssl/ssh case you'd use the same interfaces
> currently available for plugging in TPMs and dongles. It's a solved
> problem in the crypto libraries.
> 
> > What new syscalls would be needed for ssh to get all this support?
> 
> I don't see why you'd need new syscalls.

So the kernel will implement few selected crypto algorithms, similar
to what TPM would provide, using SGX, and then userspace no longer
needs to know about SGX?

Ok, I guess that's simple.

It also means it is boring, and the multiuser-game-of-the-day will not
be able to protect the (plain text) password from the cold boot
attack.

Nor will be emacs be able to protect in-memory copy of my diary from
cold boot attack.

So I guess yes, some new syscalls would be nice :-).
									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html