linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.5 198/200] tpm: fix: set continueSession attribute for the unseal operation

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Message-Id: <20160503000601.138201352@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:	Mon,  2 May 2016 17:13:17 -0700
From:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.5 198/200] tpm: fix: set continueSession attribute for the unseal operation

4.5-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>

commit c0b5eed110dcf520aadafefbcc40658cbdd18b95 upstream.

It's better to set the continueSession attribute for the unseal
operation so that the session object is not removed as a side-effect
when the operation is successful. Since a user process created the
session, it should be also decide when the session is destroyed.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Fixes: 5beb0c435b ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c |   10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -20,7 +20,11 @@
 #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
 
 enum tpm2_object_attributes {
-	TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH	= BIT(6),
+	TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH		= BIT(6),
+};
+
+enum tpm2_session_attributes {
+	TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION	= BIT(0),
 };
 
 struct tpm2_startup_in {
@@ -489,7 +493,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *c
 		tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
 			       options->policydigest_len);
 	} else {
-		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH);
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH);
 		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
 	}
 
@@ -627,7 +631,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *
 			     options->policyhandle ?
 			     options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW,
 			     NULL /* nonce */, 0,
-			     0 /* session_attributes */,
+			     TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
 			     options->blobauth /* hmac */,
 			     TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);