linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.5 197/200] tpm: fix checks for policy digest existence in tpm2_seal

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Message-Id: <20160503000601.107208775@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:	Mon,  2 May 2016 17:13:16 -0700
From:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org, Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
	Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.5 197/200] tpm: fix checks for policy digest existence in tpm2_seal_trusted()

4.5-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>

commit f3c82ade7c59303167d56b0be3e0707751fc45e2 upstream.

In my original patch sealing with policy was done with dynamically
allocated buffer that I changed later into an array so the checks in
tpm2-cmd.c became invalid. This patch fixes the issue.

Fixes: 5beb0c435bdd ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c |   12 ++++--------
 include/keys/trusted-type.h |    2 +-
 security/keys/trusted.c     |   11 +++++------
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -478,20 +478,16 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *c
 	tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable);
 
 	/* public */
-	if (options->policydigest)
-		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->digest_len);
-	else
-		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14);
-
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len);
 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
 
 	/* policy */
-	if (options->policydigest) {
+	if (options->policydigest_len) {
 		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
-		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->digest_len);
+		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
 		tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
-			       options->digest_len);
+			       options->policydigest_len);
 	} else {
 		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH);
 		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options {
 	unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
 	int pcrlock;
 	uint32_t hash;
-	uint32_t digest_len;
+	uint32_t policydigest_len;
 	unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	uint32_t policyhandle;
 };
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -744,6 +744,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct tr
 	unsigned long handle;
 	unsigned long lock;
 	unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+	unsigned int digest_len;
 	int i;
 	int tpm2;
 
@@ -752,7 +753,6 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct tr
 		return tpm2;
 
 	opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
-	opt->digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
 
 	while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
 		if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
@@ -812,8 +812,6 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct tr
 			for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
 				if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
 					opt->hash = i;
-					opt->digest_len =
-						hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
 					break;
 				}
 			}
@@ -825,13 +823,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct tr
 			}
 			break;
 		case Opt_policydigest:
-			if (!tpm2 ||
-			    strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * opt->digest_len))
+			digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
+			if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
 				return -EINVAL;
 			res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
-				      opt->digest_len);
+				      digest_len);
 			if (res < 0)
 				return -EINVAL;
+			opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
 			break;
 		case Opt_policyhandle:
 			if (!tpm2)