linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20160506113944.GE24074@intel.com>
Date:	Fri, 6 May 2016 14:39:44 +0300
From:	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:	"Dr. Greg Wettstein" <greg@...ellic.com>
Cc:	"Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@...il.com>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
	"open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" <devel@...verdev.osuosl.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions

On Tue, May 03, 2016 at 04:06:27AM -0500, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
> It would be helpful and instructive for anyone involved in this debate
> to review the following URL which details Intel's SGX licening
> program:
> 
> https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-sgx-product-licensing

I think it would be good  to note that the licensing process is available
only for Windows. For Linux you can only use debug enclaves at the
moment. The default LE has "allow-all" policy for debug enclaves.

> I think the only way forward to make all of this palatable is to
> embrace something similar to what has been done with Secure Boot.  The
> Root Enclave Key will need to be something which can be reconfigured
> by the Platform Owner through BIOS/EFI.  That model would take Intel
> off the hook from a security perspective and establish the notion of
> platform trust to be a bilateral relationship between a service
> provider and client.

This concern has been raised many times now. Sadly this did not make
into Skyle but in future we will have one shot MSRs (can be set only
once per boot cycle) for defining your own root of trust.

/Jarkko