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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.11.1605061353290.3540@nanos>
Date: Fri, 6 May 2016 13:54:14 +0200 (CEST)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
cc: "Dr. Greg Wettstein" <greg@...ellic.com>,
"Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@...il.com>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
"open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" <devel@...verdev.osuosl.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions
On Fri, 6 May 2016, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, May 03, 2016 at 04:06:27AM -0500, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
> > It would be helpful and instructive for anyone involved in this debate
> > to review the following URL which details Intel's SGX licening
> > program:
> >
> > https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-sgx-product-licensing
>
> I think it would be good to note that the licensing process is available
> only for Windows. For Linux you can only use debug enclaves at the
> moment. The default LE has "allow-all" policy for debug enclaves.
Which makes the feature pretty useless.
> > I think the only way forward to make all of this palatable is to
> > embrace something similar to what has been done with Secure Boot. The
> > Root Enclave Key will need to be something which can be reconfigured
> > by the Platform Owner through BIOS/EFI. That model would take Intel
> > off the hook from a security perspective and establish the notion of
> > platform trust to be a bilateral relationship between a service
> > provider and client.
>
> This concern has been raised many times now. Sadly this did not make
> into Skyle but in future we will have one shot MSRs (can be set only
> once per boot cycle) for defining your own root of trust.
We'll wait for that to happen.
Thanks,
tglx
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