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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLA38thQAa6Uj0YCFvwGgus2a21GaFsD8PcD1ZvhS+Wkg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 6 May 2016 08:31:29 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Yinghai Lu <yinghai@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@...aani.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 10/11] x86/KASLR: Add physical address randomization >4G
On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 1:27 AM, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com> wrote:
> Hi Kees,
>
> On 05/05/16 at 03:13pm, Kees Cook wrote:
>> From: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
>>
>> This patch exchanges the prior slots[] array for the new slot_areas[]
>> array, and lifts the limitation of KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on the physical
>> address offset for 64-bit. As before, process_e820_entry() walks
>
> Sorry, I didn't get what you said about lifting the limitation for
> 64-bit. Do you mean 32-bit?
Prior to this patch, physical address randomization was limited to
KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on x86_64. After this patch, that limit is lifted
for x86_64 but 32-bit remains limited to KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE being the
upper physical memory position.
>
> Thanks
> Baoquan
>
>
>> memory and populates slot_areas[], splitting on any detected mem_avoid
>> collisions.
>>
>> Finally, since the slots[] array and its associated functions are not
>> needed any more, so they are removed.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
>> [kees: rewrote changelog, refactored goto into while]
>> [kees: limit 32-bit to KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE]
>> [kees: squash dead-code removal into this patch]
>> [kees: refactored to use new mem_overlap code, renamed variables]
>> [kees: updated Kconfig to reflect updated implementation]
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/Kconfig | 27 +++++----
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
>> 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> index 5892d549596d..39be0f7b49ef 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> @@ -1943,21 +1943,26 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE
>> attempts relying on knowledge of the location of kernel
>> code internals.
>>
>> - The kernel physical and virtual address can be randomized
>> - from 16MB up to 1GB on 64-bit and 512MB on 32-bit. (Note that
>> - using RANDOMIZE_BASE reduces the memory space available to
>> - kernel modules from 1.5GB to 1GB.)
>> + On 64-bit, the kernel physical and virtual addresses are
>> + randomized separately. The physical address will be anywhere
>> + between 16MB and the top of physical memory (up to 64TB). The
>> + virtual address will be randomized from 16MB up to 1GB (9 bits
>> + of entropy). Note that this also reduces the memory space
>> + available to kernel modules from 1.5GB to 1GB.
>> +
>> + On 32-bit, the kernel physical and virtual addresses are
>> + randomized together. They will be randomized from 16MB up to
>> + 512MB (8 bits of entropy).
>>
>> Entropy is generated using the RDRAND instruction if it is
>> supported. If RDTSC is supported, its value is mixed into
>> the entropy pool as well. If neither RDRAND nor RDTSC are
>> - supported, then entropy is read from the i8254 timer.
>> -
>> - Since the kernel is built using 2GB addressing, and
>> - PHYSICAL_ALIGN must be at a minimum of 2MB, only 10 bits of
>> - entropy is theoretically possible. Currently, with the
>> - default value for PHYSICAL_ALIGN and due to page table
>> - layouts, 64-bit uses 9 bits of entropy and 32-bit uses 8 bits.
>> + supported, then entropy is read from the i8254 timer. The
>> + usable entropy is limited by the kernel being built using
>> + 2GB addressing, and that PHYSICAL_ALIGN must be at a
>> + minimum of 2MB. As a result, only 10 bits of entropy is
>> + theoretically possible, but the implementations are further
>> + limited due to memory layouts.
>>
>> If CONFIG_HIBERNATE is also enabled, KASLR is disabled at boot
>> time. To enable it, boot with "kaslr" on the kernel command
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
>> index 58d0871be037..8cf705826bdc 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
>> @@ -125,17 +125,6 @@ struct mem_vector {
>> #define MEM_AVOID_MAX 4
>> static struct mem_vector mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MAX];
>>
>> -static bool mem_contains(struct mem_vector *region, struct mem_vector *item)
>> -{
>> - /* Item at least partially before region. */
>> - if (item->start < region->start)
>> - return false;
>> - /* Item at least partially after region. */
>> - if (item->start + item->size > region->start + region->size)
>> - return false;
>> - return true;
>> -}
>> -
>> static bool mem_overlaps(struct mem_vector *one, struct mem_vector *two)
>> {
>> /* Item one is entirely before item two. */
>> @@ -286,8 +275,6 @@ static bool mem_avoid_overlap(struct mem_vector *img,
>> return is_overlapping;
>> }
>>
>> -static unsigned long slots[KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN];
>> -
>> struct slot_area {
>> unsigned long addr;
>> int num;
>> @@ -318,36 +305,44 @@ static void store_slot_info(struct mem_vector *region, unsigned long image_size)
>> }
>> }
>>
>> -static void slots_append(unsigned long addr)
>> -{
>> - /* Overflowing the slots list should be impossible. */
>> - if (slot_max >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN)
>> - return;
>> -
>> - slots[slot_max++] = addr;
>> -}
>> -
>> static unsigned long slots_fetch_random(void)
>> {
>> + unsigned long slot;
>> + int i;
>> +
>> /* Handle case of no slots stored. */
>> if (slot_max == 0)
>> return 0;
>>
>> - return slots[get_random_long("Physical") % slot_max];
>> + slot = get_random_long("Physical") % slot_max;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < slot_area_index; i++) {
>> + if (slot >= slot_areas[i].num) {
>> + slot -= slot_areas[i].num;
>> + continue;
>> + }
>> + return slot_areas[i].addr + slot * CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (i == slot_area_index)
>> + debug_putstr("slots_fetch_random() failed!?\n");
>> + return 0;
>> }
>>
>> static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry,
>> unsigned long minimum,
>> unsigned long image_size)
>> {
>> - struct mem_vector region, img, overlap;
>> + struct mem_vector region, overlap;
>> + struct slot_area slot_area;
>> + unsigned long start_orig;
>>
>> /* Skip non-RAM entries. */
>> if (entry->type != E820_RAM)
>> return;
>>
>> - /* Ignore entries entirely above our maximum. */
>> - if (entry->addr >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
>> + /* On 32-bit, ignore entries entirely above our maximum. */
>> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) && entry->addr >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
>> return;
Since physical and virtual are not separated on 32-bit, it means the
32-bit physical address selection becomes the virtual address
selection, and as such, it cannot be above KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on
32-bit.
-Kees
>>
>> /* Ignore entries entirely below our minimum. */
>> @@ -357,31 +352,55 @@ static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry,
>> region.start = entry->addr;
>> region.size = entry->size;
>>
>> - /* Potentially raise address to minimum location. */
>> - if (region.start < minimum)
>> - region.start = minimum;
>> + /* Give up if slot area array is full. */
>> + while (slot_area_index < MAX_SLOT_AREA) {
>> + start_orig = region.start;
>>
>> - /* Potentially raise address to meet alignment requirements. */
>> - region.start = ALIGN(region.start, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
>> + /* Potentially raise address to minimum location. */
>> + if (region.start < minimum)
>> + region.start = minimum;
>>
>> - /* Did we raise the address above the bounds of this e820 region? */
>> - if (region.start > entry->addr + entry->size)
>> - return;
>> + /* Potentially raise address to meet alignment needs. */
>> + region.start = ALIGN(region.start, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
>>
>> - /* Reduce size by any delta from the original address. */
>> - region.size -= region.start - entry->addr;
>> + /* Did we raise the address above this e820 region? */
>> + if (region.start > entry->addr + entry->size)
>> + return;
>>
>> - /* Reduce maximum size to fit end of image within maximum limit. */
>> - if (region.start + region.size > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
>> - region.size = KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - region.start;
>> + /* Reduce size by any delta from the original address. */
>> + region.size -= region.start - start_orig;
>>
>> - /* Walk each aligned slot and check for avoided areas. */
>> - for (img.start = region.start, img.size = image_size ;
>> - mem_contains(®ion, &img) ;
>> - img.start += CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN) {
>> - if (mem_avoid_overlap(&img, &overlap))
>> - continue;
>> - slots_append(img.start);
>> + /* On 32-bit, reduce region size to fit within max size. */
>> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) &&
>> + region.start + region.size > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
>> + region.size = KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - region.start;
>> +
>> + /* Return if region can't contain decompressed kernel */
>> + if (region.size < image_size)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + /* If nothing overlaps, store the region and return. */
>> + if (!mem_avoid_overlap(®ion, &overlap)) {
>> + store_slot_info(®ion, image_size);
>> + return;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Store beginning of region if holds at least image_size. */
>> + if (overlap.start > region.start + image_size) {
>> + struct mem_vector beginning;
>> +
>> + beginning.start = region.start;
>> + beginning.size = overlap.start - region.start;
>> + store_slot_info(&beginning, image_size);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Return if overlap extends to or past end of region. */
>> + if (overlap.start + overlap.size >= region.start + region.size)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + /* Clip off the overlapping region and start over. */
>> + region.size -= overlap.start - region.start + overlap.size;
>> + region.start = overlap.start + overlap.size;
>> }
>> }
>>
>> @@ -398,6 +417,10 @@ static unsigned long find_random_phys_addr(unsigned long minimum,
>> for (i = 0; i < boot_params->e820_entries; i++) {
>> process_e820_entry(&boot_params->e820_map[i], minimum,
>> image_size);
>> + if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA) {
>> + debug_putstr("Aborted e820 scan (slot_areas full)!\n");
>> + break;
>> + }
>> }
>>
>> return slots_fetch_random();
>> --
>> 2.6.3
>>
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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