linux-kernel - [PATCH] arm64: kernel: Fix incorrect brk randomization

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Date:	Tue, 10 May 2016 10:55:49 -0700
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Cc:	"Jon Medhurst (Tixy)" <tixy@...aro.org>,
	Hector Marco <hecmargi@....es>,
	Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@...aro.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
	AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>,
	Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@....com>,
	Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@...vell.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
	James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: kernel: Fix incorrect brk randomization

This fixes two issues with the arm64 brk randomziation. First, the
STACK_RND_MASK was being used incorrectly. The original code was:

	unsigned long range_end = base + (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT) + 1;

STACK_RND_MASK is 0x7ff (32-bit) or 0x3ffff (64-bit), with 4K pages where
PAGE_SHIFT is 12:

	#define STACK_RND_MASK	(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
						0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
						0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))

This means the resulting offset from base would be 0x7ff0001 or 0x3ffff0001,
which is wrong since it creates an unaligned end address. It was likely
intended to be:

	unsigned long range_end = base + ((STACK_RND_MASK + 1) << PAGE_SHIFT)

Which would result in offsets of 0x800000 (32-bit) and 0x40000000 (64-bit).

However, even this corrected 32-bit compat offset (0x00800000) is much
smaller than native ARM's brk randomization value (0x02000000):

	unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
	{
	        unsigned long range_end = mm->brk + 0x02000000;
	        return randomize_range(mm->brk, range_end, 0) ? : mm->brk;
	}

So, instead of basing arm64's brk randomization on mistaken STACK_RND_MASK
calculations, just use specific corrected values for compat (0x2000000)
and native arm64 (0x40000000).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 15 ++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
index 80624829db61..0d0969bcd76d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
@@ -382,13 +382,14 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
 	return sp & ~0xf;
 }
 
-static unsigned long randomize_base(unsigned long base)
-{
-	unsigned long range_end = base + (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT) + 1;
-	return randomize_range(base, range_end, 0) ? : base;
-}
-
 unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
-	return randomize_base(mm->brk);
+	unsigned long range_end = mm->brk;
+
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
+		range_end += 0x02000000;
+	else
+		range_end += 0x40000000;
+
+	return randomize_range(mm->brk, range_end, 0) ? : mm->brk;
 }
-- 
2.6.3


-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security