linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.12 13/76] efi: Fix out-of-bounds read in variable

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <5114cf469deeca0556168a8d8eafb20255dd8b57.1463648873.git.jslaby@suse.cz>
Date:	Thu, 19 May 2016 11:07:35 +0200
From:	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To:	stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@...hat.com>,
	Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...eos.com>,
	Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@...il.com>,
	Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@...ux.intel.com>,
	Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: [PATCH 3.12 13/76] efi: Fix out-of-bounds read in variable_matches()

From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@...hat.com>

3.12-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 630ba0cc7a6dbafbdee43795617c872b35cde1b4 upstream.

The variable_matches() function can currently read "var_name[len]", for
example when:

 - var_name[0] == 'a',
 - len == 1
 - match_name points to the NUL-terminated string "ab".

This function is supposed to accept "var_name" inputs that are not
NUL-terminated (hence the "len" parameter"). Document the function, and
access "var_name[*match]" only if "*match" is smaller than "len".

Reported-by: Chris Wilson <chris@...is-wilson.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@...hat.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...eos.com>
Cc: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@...il.com>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@...ux.intel.com>
Link: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.freedesktop.xorg.drivers.intel/86906
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c
index 4e2f46938bf0..e7566d4931c6 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c
@@ -202,29 +202,44 @@ static const struct variable_validate variable_validate[] = {
 	{ NULL_GUID, "", NULL },
 };
 
+/*
+ * Check if @var_name matches the pattern given in @match_name.
+ *
+ * @var_name: an array of @len non-NUL characters.
+ * @match_name: a NUL-terminated pattern string, optionally ending in "*". A
+ *              final "*" character matches any trailing characters @var_name,
+ *              including the case when there are none left in @var_name.
+ * @match: on output, the number of non-wildcard characters in @match_name
+ *         that @var_name matches, regardless of the return value.
+ * @return: whether @var_name fully matches @match_name.
+ */
 static bool
 variable_matches(const char *var_name, size_t len, const char *match_name,
 		 int *match)
 {
 	for (*match = 0; ; (*match)++) {
 		char c = match_name[*match];
-		char u = var_name[*match];
 
-		/* Wildcard in the matching name means we've matched */
-		if (c == '*')
+		switch (c) {
+		case '*':
+			/* Wildcard in @match_name means we've matched. */
 			return true;
 
-		/* Case sensitive match */
-		if (!c && *match == len)
-			return true;
+		case '\0':
+			/* @match_name has ended. Has @var_name too? */
+			return (*match == len);
 
-		if (c != u)
+		default:
+			/*
+			 * We've reached a non-wildcard char in @match_name.
+			 * Continue only if there's an identical character in
+			 * @var_name.
+			 */
+			if (*match < len && c == var_name[*match])
+				continue;
 			return false;
-
-		if (!c)
-			return true;
+		}
 	}
-	return true;
 }
 
 bool
-- 
2.8.2