linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.6 003/100] arm64: Implement ptep_set_access

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Message-Id: <20160530204908.554748162@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:	Mon, 30 May 2016 13:48:58 -0700
From:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
	Ming Lei <tom.leiming@...il.com>,
	Julien Grall <julien.grall@....com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.6 003/100] arm64: Implement ptep_set_access_flags() for hardware AF/DBM

4.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>

commit 66dbd6e61a526ae7d11a208238ae2c17e5cacb6b upstream.

When hardware updates of the access and dirty states are enabled, the
default ptep_set_access_flags() implementation based on calling
set_pte_at() directly is potentially racy. This triggers the "racy dirty
state clearing" warning in set_pte_at() because an existing writable PTE
is overridden with a clean entry.

There are two main scenarios for this situation:

1. The CPU getting an access fault does not support hardware updates of
   the access/dirty flags. However, a different agent in the system
   (e.g. SMMU) can do this, therefore overriding a writable entry with a
   clean one could potentially lose the automatically updated dirty
   status

2. A more complex situation is possible when all CPUs support hardware
   AF/DBM:

   a) Initial state: shareable + writable vma and pte_none(pte)
   b) Read fault taken by two threads of the same process on different
      CPUs
   c) CPU0 takes the mmap_sem and proceeds to handling the fault. It
      eventually reaches do_set_pte() which sets a writable + clean pte.
      CPU0 releases the mmap_sem
   d) CPU1 acquires the mmap_sem and proceeds to handle_pte_fault(). The
      pte entry it reads is present, writable and clean and it continues
      to pte_mkyoung()
   e) CPU1 calls ptep_set_access_flags()

   If between (d) and (e) the hardware (another CPU) updates the dirty
   state (clears PTE_RDONLY), CPU1 will override the PTR_RDONLY bit
   marking the entry clean again.

This patch implements an arm64-specific ptep_set_access_flags() function
to perform an atomic update of the PTE flags.

Fixes: 2f4b829c625e ("arm64: Add support for hardware updates of the access and dirty pte bits")
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Reported-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@...il.com>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@....com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
[will: reworded comment]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h |    5 +++
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c            |   50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -526,6 +526,11 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_modify(pmd_t pmd
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM
+#define __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_SET_ACCESS_FLAGS
+extern int ptep_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				 unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep,
+				 pte_t entry, int dirty);
+
 /*
  * Atomic pte/pmd modifications.
  */
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -81,6 +81,56 @@ void show_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsi
 	printk("\n");
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM
+/*
+ * This function sets the access flags (dirty, accessed), as well as write
+ * permission, and only to a more permissive setting.
+ *
+ * It needs to cope with hardware update of the accessed/dirty state by other
+ * agents in the system and can safely skip the __sync_icache_dcache() call as,
+ * like set_pte_at(), the PTE is never changed from no-exec to exec here.
+ *
+ * Returns whether or not the PTE actually changed.
+ */
+int ptep_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+			  unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep,
+			  pte_t entry, int dirty)
+{
+	pteval_t old_pteval;
+	unsigned int tmp;
+
+	if (pte_same(*ptep, entry))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* only preserve the access flags and write permission */
+	pte_val(entry) &= PTE_AF | PTE_WRITE | PTE_DIRTY;
+
+	/*
+	 * PTE_RDONLY is cleared by default in the asm below, so set it in
+	 * back if necessary (read-only or clean PTE).
+	 */
+	if (!pte_write(entry) || !dirty)
+		pte_val(entry) |= PTE_RDONLY;
+
+	/*
+	 * Setting the flags must be done atomically to avoid racing with the
+	 * hardware update of the access/dirty state.
+	 */
+	asm volatile("//	ptep_set_access_flags\n"
+	"	prfm	pstl1strm, %2\n"
+	"1:	ldxr	%0, %2\n"
+	"	and	%0, %0, %3		// clear PTE_RDONLY\n"
+	"	orr	%0, %0, %4		// set flags\n"
+	"	stxr	%w1, %0, %2\n"
+	"	cbnz	%w1, 1b\n"
+	: "=&r" (old_pteval), "=&r" (tmp), "+Q" (pte_val(*ptep))
+	: "L" (~PTE_RDONLY), "r" (pte_val(entry)));
+
+	flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault(vma, address);
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * The kernel tried to access some page that wasn't present.
  */