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Message-ID: <3381856.qSaz1KcX2Z@positron.chronox.de>
Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2016 18:31:26 +0200
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc: David Jaša <djasa@...hat.com>,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, sandyinchina@...il.com,
Jason Cooper <cryptography@...edaemon.net>,
John Denker <jsd@...n.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
George Spelvin <linux@...izon.com>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach
Am Samstag, 18. Juni 2016, 10:44:08 schrieb Theodore Ts'o:
Hi Theodore,
>
> At the end of the day, with these devices you really badly need a
> hardware RNG. We can't generate randomness out of thin air. The only
> thing you really can do requires user space help, which is to generate
> keys lazily, or as late as possible, so you can gather as much entropy
> as you can --- and to feed in measurements from the WiFi (RSSI
> measurements, MAC addresses seen, etc.) This won't help much if you
> have an FBI van parked outside your house trying to carry out a
> TEMPEST attack, but hopefully it provides some protection against a
> remote attacker who isn't try to carry out an on-premises attack.
All my measurements on such small systems like MIPS or smaller/older ARMs do
not seem to support that statement :-)
Ciao
Stephan
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