linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG

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Message-ID: <2101992.L9gKN5cFdv@tauon.atsec.com>
Date:	Mon, 20 Jun 2016 17:49:17 +0200
From:	Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To:	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc:	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
	Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, andi@...stfloor.org,
	sandyinchina@...il.com, jsd@...n.com, hpa@...or.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG

Am Montag, 20. Juni 2016, 11:01:47 schrieb Theodore Ts'o:

Hi Theodore,

> 
> So simply doing chacha20 encryption in a tight loop in the kernel
> might not be a good proxy for what would actually happen in real life
> when someone calls getrandom(2).  (Another good question to ask is
> when someone might be needing to generate millions of 256-bit session
> keys per second, when the D-H setup, even if you were using ECCDH,
> would be largely dominating the time for the connection setup anyway.)

Is speed everything we should care about? What about:

- offloading of crypto operation from the CPU

- potentially additional security features a hardware cipher may provide like 
cache coloring attack resistance?

Ciao
Stephan