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Message-ID: <b9ce7eec-e573-f187-feb5-b1110313f2ac@zytor.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2016 11:52:10 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, andi@...stfloor.org,
sandyinchina@...il.com, jsd@...n.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a
Chacha20-based CRNG
On 06/20/16 08:49, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Montag, 20. Juni 2016, 11:01:47 schrieb Theodore Ts'o:
>
> Hi Theodore,
>
>>
>> So simply doing chacha20 encryption in a tight loop in the kernel
>> might not be a good proxy for what would actually happen in real life
>> when someone calls getrandom(2). (Another good question to ask is
>> when someone might be needing to generate millions of 256-bit session
>> keys per second, when the D-H setup, even if you were using ECCDH,
>> would be largely dominating the time for the connection setup anyway.)
>
> Is speed everything we should care about? What about:
>
> - offloading of crypto operation from the CPU
>
This sounds like a speed operation (and very unlikely to be a win given
the usage).
> - potentially additional security features a hardware cipher may provide like
> cache coloring attack resistance?
How about burning that bridge when and if we get to it? It sounds very
hypothetical.
I guess I could add in some comments here about how a lot of these
problems can be eliminated by offloading an entire DRNG into hardware,
but I don't think it is productive.
-hpa
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