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Message-ID: <CALCETrU3B1fiEQTS8d=w+outfWu3aMjT67LGtStCxYZgvfXomg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2016 12:37:44 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Pedro Alves <palves@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code
On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 9:29 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> Setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace is wrong: if we happen to do it during
> syscall entry, then we'll confuse seccomp and audit. (The former
> isn't a security problem: seccomp is currently entirely insecure if a
> malicious ptracer is attached.) As a minimal fix, this patch adds a
> new flag TS_I386_REGS_POKED that handles the ptrace special case.
>
> Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@...hat.com>
> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
In case you're interested, my draft followup (definitely not for x86/urgent) is:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/linux.git/commit/?h=x86/vmap_stack&id=50d2f2a9fe1b
Pedro, this appears to pass ptrace-tests. I need to try the 64-vs-32
thing, but it's intended to fix it for real. It may not work for in
really exotic cases like gdb under UML, but I don't know if we can fix
that even in principle.
Some day we should expose syscall arch directly via ptrace.
--Andy
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