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Message-Id: <1470937490-7375-1-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2016 18:44:50 +0100
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions
The ARMv8 architecture allows execute-only user permissions by clearing
the PTE_UXN and PTE_USER bits. However, the kernel running on a CPU
implementation without User Access Override (ARMv8.2 onwards) can still
access such page, so execute-only page permission does not protect
against read(2)/write(2) etc. accesses. Systems requiring such
protection must enable features like SECCOMP.
This patch changes the arm64 __P100 and __S100 protection_map[] macros
to the new __PAGE_EXECONLY attributes. A side effect is that
pte_user() no longer triggers for __PAGE_EXECONLY since PTE_USER isn't
set. To work around this, the check is done on the PTE_NG bit via the
pte_ng() macro. VM_READ is also checked now for page faults.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 5 +++--
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 +++++-----
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 5 ++---
mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
index 39f5252673f7..2142c7726e76 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
@@ -70,12 +70,13 @@
#define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
#define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN)
#define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
+#define PAGE_EXECONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
#define __P000 PAGE_NONE
#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY
#define __P010 PAGE_COPY
#define __P011 PAGE_COPY
-#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
+#define __P100 PAGE_EXECONLY
#define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __P110 PAGE_COPY_EXEC
#define __P111 PAGE_COPY_EXEC
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@
#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY
#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED
-#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
+#define __S100 PAGE_EXECONLY
#define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
#define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index dbb1b7bf1b07..403a61cf4967 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
#define pte_write(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_WRITE))
#define pte_exec(pte) (!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_UXN))
#define pte_cont(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_CONT))
-#define pte_user(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_USER))
+#define pte_ng(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_NG))
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM
#define pte_hw_dirty(pte) (pte_write(pte) && !(pte_val(pte) & PTE_RDONLY))
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
#define pte_dirty(pte) (pte_sw_dirty(pte) || pte_hw_dirty(pte))
#define pte_valid(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_VALID))
-#define pte_valid_not_user(pte) \
- ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == PTE_VALID)
+#define pte_valid_global(pte) \
+ ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_NG)) == PTE_VALID)
#define pte_valid_young(pte) \
((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF))
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
* Only if the new pte is valid and kernel, otherwise TLB maintenance
* or update_mmu_cache() have the necessary barriers.
*/
- if (pte_valid_not_user(pte)) {
+ if (pte_valid_global(pte)) {
dsb(ishst);
isb();
}
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static inline void set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
pte_val(pte) &= ~PTE_RDONLY;
else
pte_val(pte) |= PTE_RDONLY;
- if (pte_user(pte) && pte_exec(pte) && !pte_special(pte))
+ if (pte_ng(pte) && pte_exec(pte) && !pte_special(pte))
__sync_icache_dcache(pte, addr);
}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index c8beaa0da7df..58f697fe18b6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -245,8 +245,7 @@ static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
good_area:
/*
* Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
- * occurred. If we encountered a write or exec fault, we must have
- * appropriate permissions, otherwise we allow any permission.
+ * occurred.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
@@ -281,7 +280,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
int fault, sig, code;
- unsigned long vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC;
+ unsigned long vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_WRITE;
unsigned int mm_flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE;
if (notify_page_fault(regs, esr))
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index ca9d91bca0d6..69cad562cd00 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ static void unmap_region(struct mm_struct *mm,
* w: (no) no w: (no) no w: (copy) copy w: (no) no
* x: (no) no x: (no) yes x: (no) yes x: (yes) yes
*
+ * On arm64, PROT_EXEC has the following behaviour for both MAP_SHARED and
+ * MAP_PRIVATE:
+ * r: (no) no
+ * w: (no) no
+ * x: (yes) yes
*/
pgprot_t protection_map[16] = {
__P000, __P001, __P010, __P011, __P100, __P101, __P110, __P111,
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