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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJTuJ+k948BU4rDGF=tHv54TR0JQVTbcVvzp=NtfQrL9Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2016 11:23:03 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Cc: "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions
On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 10:44 AM, Catalin Marinas
<catalin.marinas@....com> wrote:
> The ARMv8 architecture allows execute-only user permissions by clearing
> the PTE_UXN and PTE_USER bits. However, the kernel running on a CPU
> implementation without User Access Override (ARMv8.2 onwards) can still
> access such page, so execute-only page permission does not protect
> against read(2)/write(2) etc. accesses. Systems requiring such
> protection must enable features like SECCOMP.
So, UAO CPUs will bypass this protection in userspace if using
read/write on a memory-mapped file? I'm just trying to make sure I
understand the bypass scenario. And is this something that can be
fixed? If we add exec-only, I feel like it shouldn't have corner case
surprises. :)
-Kees
>
> This patch changes the arm64 __P100 and __S100 protection_map[] macros
> to the new __PAGE_EXECONLY attributes. A side effect is that
> pte_user() no longer triggers for __PAGE_EXECONLY since PTE_USER isn't
> set. To work around this, the check is done on the PTE_NG bit via the
> pte_ng() macro. VM_READ is also checked now for page faults.
>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 5 +++--
> arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 +++++-----
> arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 5 ++---
> mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++
> 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
> index 39f5252673f7..2142c7726e76 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
> @@ -70,12 +70,13 @@
> #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
> #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN)
> #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
> +#define PAGE_EXECONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
>
> #define __P000 PAGE_NONE
> #define __P001 PAGE_READONLY
> #define __P010 PAGE_COPY
> #define __P011 PAGE_COPY
> -#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
> +#define __P100 PAGE_EXECONLY
> #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
> #define __P110 PAGE_COPY_EXEC
> #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_EXEC
> @@ -84,7 +85,7 @@
> #define __S001 PAGE_READONLY
> #define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
> #define __S011 PAGE_SHARED
> -#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
> +#define __S100 PAGE_EXECONLY
> #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
> #define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
> #define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
> index dbb1b7bf1b07..403a61cf4967 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
> #define pte_write(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_WRITE))
> #define pte_exec(pte) (!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_UXN))
> #define pte_cont(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_CONT))
> -#define pte_user(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_USER))
> +#define pte_ng(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_NG))
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM
> #define pte_hw_dirty(pte) (pte_write(pte) && !(pte_val(pte) & PTE_RDONLY))
> @@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
> #define pte_dirty(pte) (pte_sw_dirty(pte) || pte_hw_dirty(pte))
>
> #define pte_valid(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_VALID))
> -#define pte_valid_not_user(pte) \
> - ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == PTE_VALID)
> +#define pte_valid_global(pte) \
> + ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_NG)) == PTE_VALID)
> #define pte_valid_young(pte) \
> ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF))
>
> @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
> * Only if the new pte is valid and kernel, otherwise TLB maintenance
> * or update_mmu_cache() have the necessary barriers.
> */
> - if (pte_valid_not_user(pte)) {
> + if (pte_valid_global(pte)) {
> dsb(ishst);
> isb();
> }
> @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static inline void set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
> pte_val(pte) &= ~PTE_RDONLY;
> else
> pte_val(pte) |= PTE_RDONLY;
> - if (pte_user(pte) && pte_exec(pte) && !pte_special(pte))
> + if (pte_ng(pte) && pte_exec(pte) && !pte_special(pte))
> __sync_icache_dcache(pte, addr);
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> index c8beaa0da7df..58f697fe18b6 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> @@ -245,8 +245,7 @@ static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
> good_area:
> /*
> * Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
> - * occurred. If we encountered a write or exec fault, we must have
> - * appropriate permissions, otherwise we allow any permission.
> + * occurred.
> */
> if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
> fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
> @@ -281,7 +280,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
> struct task_struct *tsk;
> struct mm_struct *mm;
> int fault, sig, code;
> - unsigned long vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC;
> + unsigned long vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_WRITE;
> unsigned int mm_flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE;
>
> if (notify_page_fault(regs, esr))
> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> index ca9d91bca0d6..69cad562cd00 100644
> --- a/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ static void unmap_region(struct mm_struct *mm,
> * w: (no) no w: (no) no w: (copy) copy w: (no) no
> * x: (no) no x: (no) yes x: (no) yes x: (yes) yes
> *
> + * On arm64, PROT_EXEC has the following behaviour for both MAP_SHARED and
> + * MAP_PRIVATE:
> + * r: (no) no
> + * w: (no) no
> + * x: (yes) yes
> */
> pgprot_t protection_map[16] = {
> __P000, __P001, __P010, __P011, __P100, __P101, __P110, __P111,
--
Kees Cook
Nexus Security
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