linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions

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Date:   Thu, 25 Aug 2016 11:30:42 +0100
From:   Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
To:     Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" 
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions

On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 05:18:24PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 10:45:09AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 3:47 AM, Catalin Marinas
> > <catalin.marinas@....com> wrote:
> > > On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 11:23:03AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > >> On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 10:44 AM, Catalin Marinas
> > >> <catalin.marinas@....com> wrote:
> > >> > The ARMv8 architecture allows execute-only user permissions by clearing
> > >> > the PTE_UXN and PTE_USER bits. However, the kernel running on a CPU
> > >> > implementation without User Access Override (ARMv8.2 onwards) can still
> > >> > access such page, so execute-only page permission does not protect
> > >> > against read(2)/write(2) etc. accesses. Systems requiring such
> > >> > protection must enable features like SECCOMP.
> > >>
> > >> So, UAO CPUs will bypass this protection in userspace if using
> > >> read/write on a memory-mapped file?
> > >
> > > It's the other way around. CPUs prior to ARMv8.2 (when UAO was
> > > introduced) or with the CONFIG_ARM64_UAO disabled can still access
> > > user execute-only memory regions while running in kernel mode via the
> > > copy_*_user, (get|put)_user etc. routines. So a way user can bypass this
> > > protection is by using such address as argument to read/write file
> > > operations.
> > 
> > Ah, okay. So exec-only for _userspace_ will always work, but exec-only
> > for _kernel_ will only work on ARMv8.2 with CONFIG_ARM64_UAO?
> 
> Yes (mostly). With UAO, we changed the user access routines in the
> kernel to use the LDTR/STTR instructions which always behave
> unprivileged even when executed in kernel mode (unless the UAO bit is
> set to override this restriction, needed for set_fs(KERNEL_DS)).
> 
> Even with UAO, we still have two cases where the kernel cannot perform
> unprivileged accesses (LDTR/STTR) since they don't have an exclusives
> equivalent (LDXR/STXR). These are in-user futex atomic ops and the SWP
> emulation for 32-bit binaries (armv8_deprecated.c). But these require
> write permission, so they would always fault even when running in the
> kernel. futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() is able to return the old value
> without a write (if it differs from "oldval") but it doesn't look like
> such value could leak to user space.

If this was an issue, couldn't we add a dummy LDTR before the LDXR, and
have the fixup handler return -EFAULT?

Either way, this series looks technically fine to me:

Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>

but it would be good for some security-focussed person (Hi, Kees!) to
comment on whether or not this is useful, given the caveats you've
described. If it is, I can queue it for 4.9.

Will