| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Sun, 9 Oct 2016 16:36:39 +0200
From: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@...il.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: use an enum for possible hidepid values
(Second, rebased submission, since first submission yielded no replies.)
Previously, the hidepid parameter was checked by comparing literal
integers 0, 1, 2. Let's add a proper enum for this, to make the checking
more expressive:
0 → HIDEPID_OFF
1 → HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS
2 → HIDEPID_INVISIBLE
This changes the internal labelling only, the userspace-facing interface
remains unmodified, and still works with literal integers 0, 1, 2.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@...il.com>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
fs/proc/inode.c | 2 +-
fs/proc/root.c | 3 ++-
include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 6 ++++++
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index dc7fe5f..2680794 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -743,11 +743,11 @@ static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
- has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 1);
+ has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!has_perms) {
- if (pid->hide_pid == 2) {
+ if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
/*
* Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open()
* consistent with each other. If a process
@@ -1705,7 +1705,7 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
stat->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
if (task) {
- if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 2)) {
+ if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists,
@@ -3166,7 +3166,7 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
iter.tgid += 1, iter = next_tgid(ns, iter)) {
char name[PROC_NUMBUF];
int len;
- if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, 2))
+ if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE))
continue;
len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%d", iter.tgid);
diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
index c1b7238..7b28103 100644
--- a/fs/proc/inode.c
+++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid));
- if (pid->hide_pid != 0)
+ if (pid->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF)
seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid);
return 0;
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index 8d3e484..2989731 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
case Opt_hidepid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
- if (option < 0 || option > 2) {
+ if (option < HIDEPID_OFF ||
+ option > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
pr_err("proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
index 34cce96..c2a989d 100644
--- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ struct pidmap {
struct fs_pin;
+enum { /* definitions for pid_namespace's hide_pid field */
+ HIDEPID_OFF = 0,
+ HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1,
+ HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2,
+};
+
struct pid_namespace {
struct kref kref;
struct pidmap pidmap[PIDMAP_ENTRIES];
--
2.7.4
Powered by blists - more mailing lists