| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <87d1ilrdmt.fsf_-_@xmission.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2016 10:54:34 -0500
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andrey Vagin <avagin@...tuozzo.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...tuozzo.com>,
Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>
Subject: [REVIEW][PATCH v2] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks
During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is
not readable by the user executing the file. A bug in
ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to
enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER),
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER).
This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding
a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec, so
it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present in
to be able to safely give read permission to the executable.
The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer
has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns.
This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate
user namespace it does not become ptraceable.
The function ptrace_attach is modified to only set PT_PTRACE_CAP when
CAP_SYS_PTRACE is held over task->mm->user_ns. The intent of
PT_PTRACE_CAP is to be a flag to note that whatever permission changes
the task might go through the tracer has sufficient permissions for
it not to be an issue. task->cred->user_ns is always the same
as or descendent of mm->user_ns. Which guarantees that having
CAP_SYS_PTRACE over mm->user_ns is the worst case for the tasks
credentials.
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Fixes: 8409cca70561 ("userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
---
Jann or anyone who looked at my last version of this that I thought
was ready to go, I have change the test in ptrace_may_access from:
if (!mm ||
((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
!ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
return -EPERM;
to:
if (mm &&
((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
!ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
return -EPERM;
As enforcing the dumpablity check without an mm caused a regression for
Cyrill (he could not read task->exit code of a zomebie even with a full
set of caps).
Further I have moved the setting of PT_PTRACE_CAP up in ptrace_attach
so that I can easily use the mm->user_ns.
I can't imagine either of these changes making a practical difference
to anyone but I am calling them out in case someone can.
include/linux/mm_types.h | 1 +
kernel/fork.c | 9 ++++++---
kernel/ptrace.c | 26 +++++++++++---------------
mm/init-mm.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h
index 4a8acedf4b7d..08d947fc4c59 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h
@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ struct mm_struct {
*/
struct task_struct __rcu *owner;
#endif
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns;
/* store ref to file /proc/<pid>/exe symlink points to */
struct file __rcu *exe_file;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 623259fc794d..fd85c68c2791 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -742,7 +742,8 @@ static void mm_init_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
#endif
}
-static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
+static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
mm->mmap = NULL;
mm->mm_rb = RB_ROOT;
@@ -782,6 +783,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
if (init_new_context(p, mm))
goto fail_nocontext;
+ mm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
return mm;
fail_nocontext:
@@ -827,7 +829,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_alloc(void)
return NULL;
memset(mm, 0, sizeof(*mm));
- return mm_init(mm, current);
+ return mm_init(mm, current, current_user_ns());
}
/*
@@ -842,6 +844,7 @@ void __mmdrop(struct mm_struct *mm)
destroy_context(mm);
mmu_notifier_mm_destroy(mm);
check_mm(mm);
+ put_user_ns(mm->user_ns);
free_mm(mm);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__mmdrop);
@@ -1123,7 +1126,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *dup_mm(struct task_struct *tsk)
memcpy(mm, oldmm, sizeof(*mm));
- if (!mm_init(mm, tsk))
+ if (!mm_init(mm, tsk, mm->user_ns))
goto fail_nomem;
err = dup_mmap(mm, oldmm);
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 2a99027312a6..44a25a1e6e83 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
- int dumpable = 0;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
kuid_t caller_uid;
kgid_t caller_gid;
@@ -271,16 +271,11 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
return -EPERM;
ok:
rcu_read_unlock();
- smp_rmb();
- if (task->mm)
- dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
- rcu_read_lock();
- if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return -EPERM;
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ mm = task->mm;
+ if (mm &&
+ ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
+ !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
+ return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
@@ -331,6 +326,11 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
task_lock(task);
retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
+ if (!retval) {
+ struct mm_struct *mm = task->mm;
+ if (mm && ns_capable(mm->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ flags |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
+ }
task_unlock(task);
if (retval)
goto unlock_creds;
@@ -344,10 +344,6 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
if (seize)
flags |= PT_SEIZED;
- rcu_read_lock();
- if (ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- flags |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
- rcu_read_unlock();
task->ptrace = flags;
__ptrace_link(task, current);
diff --git a/mm/init-mm.c b/mm/init-mm.c
index a56a851908d2..975e49f00f34 100644
--- a/mm/init-mm.c
+++ b/mm/init-mm.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/mmu.h>
@@ -21,5 +22,6 @@ struct mm_struct init_mm = {
.mmap_sem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_mm.mmap_sem),
.page_table_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_mm.page_table_lock),
.mmlist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_mm.mmlist),
+ .user_ns = &init_user_ns,
INIT_MM_CONTEXT(init_mm)
};
--
2.10.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists