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Date:   Fri, 18 Nov 2016 09:14:44 +0100
From:   Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To:     Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>
Cc:     Robert O'Callahan <robert@...llahan.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
        Jeff Dike <jdike@...toit.com>,
        Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
        Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@...tuozzo.com>,
        David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        user-mode-linux-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        user-mode-linux-user@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 6/7] x86/arch_prctl: Add ARCH_[GET|SET]_CPUID


* Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com> wrote:

> Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge.
> When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID
> instruction with CPL>0. Exposing this feature to userspace will allow a
> ptracer to trap and emulate the CPUID instruction.
> 
> When supported, this feature is controlled by toggling bit 0 of
> MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of
> https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991
> 
> Implement a new pair of arch_prctls, available on both x86-32 and x86-64.
> 
> ARCH_GET_CPUID: Returns the current CPUID faulting state, either
>   ARCH_CPUID_ENABLE or ARCH_CPUID_SIGSEGV. arg2 must be 0.
> 
> ARCH_SET_CPUID: Set the CPUID faulting state to arg2, which must be either
>   ARCH_CPUID_ENABLE or ARCH_CPUID_SIGSEGV. Returns EINVAL if arg2 is
>   another value or CPUID faulting is not supported on this system.

So the interface is:

> +#define ARCH_GET_CPUID 0x1005
> +#define ARCH_SET_CPUID 0x1006
> +#define ARCH_CPUID_ENABLE 1
> +#define ARCH_CPUID_SIGSEGV 2

Which maps to:

   prctl(ARCH_SET_CPUID, 0); /* -EINVAL */
   prctl(ARCH_SET_CPUID, 1); /* enable CPUID [i.e. make it work without faulting] */
   prctl(ARCH_SET_CPUID, 2); /* disable CPUID [i.e. make it fault] */

   ret = prctl(ARCH_GET_CPUID, 0); /* return current state: 1==on, 2==off */

This is a very broken interface that makes very little sense.

It would be much better to use a more natural interface where 1/0 means on/off and 
where ARCH_GET_CPUID returns the current natural state:

   prctl(ARCH_SET_CPUID, 0); /* disable CPUID [i.e. make it fault] */
   prctl(ARCH_SET_CPUID, 1); /* enable CPUID [i.e. make it work without faulting] */

   ret = prctl(ARCH_GET_CPUID); /* 1==enabled, 0==disabled */

See how natural it is? The use of the ARCH_CPUID_SIGSEGV/ENABLED symbols can be 
avoided altogether. This will cut down on some of the ugliness in the kernel code 
as well - and clean up the argument name as well: instead of naming it 'int arg2' 
it can be named the more natural 'int cpuid_enabled'.

> The state of the CPUID faulting flag is propagated across forks, but reset
> upon exec.

I don't think this is the natural API for propagating settings across exec().
We should reset the flag on exec() only if security considerations require it - 
i.e. like perf events are cleared.

If binaries that assume a working CPUID are exec()-ed then CPUID can be enabled 
explicitly.

Clearing it automatically loses the ability of a pure no-CPUID environment to 
exec() a CPUID-safe binary.

> Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@...ehuey.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h          |   3 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h          |   2 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h        |   6 +-
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h         |   6 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c               |   7 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/process.c                 |  84 ++++++++++
>  fs/exec.c                                 |   1 +
>  include/linux/thread_info.h               |   4 +
>  tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile      |   2 +-
>  tools/testing/selftests/x86/cpuid-fault.c | 254 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  10 files changed, 367 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/cpuid-fault.c

Please put the self-test into a separate patch.

>  static void init_intel_misc_features_enables(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  {
>  	u64 msr;
>  
> +	if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, &msr))
> +		return;
> +
> +	msr = 0;
> +	wrmsrl(MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, msr);
> +	this_cpu_write(msr_misc_features_enables_shadow, msr);
> +
>  	if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_PLATFORM_INFO, &msr)) {
>  		if (msr & MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT)
>  			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT);
>  	}
>  }

Sigh, so the Intel MSR index itself is grossly misnamed: MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES 
- plain reading of 'enables' suggests it's a verb, but in wants to be a noun. A 
better name would be MSR_MISC_FEATURES or so.

So while for the MSR index we want to keep the Intel name, please drop that 
_enables() postfix from the kernel C function names such as this one - and from 
the shadow value name as well.

> +DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, msr_misc_features_enables_shadow);
> +
> +static void set_cpuid_faulting(bool on)
> +{
> +	u64 msrval;
> +
> +	DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
> +
> +	msrval = this_cpu_read(msr_misc_features_enables_shadow);
> +	msrval &= ~MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT;
> +	msrval |= (on << MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT_BIT);
> +	this_cpu_write(msr_misc_features_enables_shadow, msrval);
> +	wrmsrl(MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, msrval);

This gets called from the context switch path and this looks pretty suboptimal, 
especially when combined with the TIF flag check:

>  void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
>  		      struct tss_struct *tss)
>  {
>  	struct thread_struct *prev, *next;
>  
>  	prev = &prev_p->thread;
>  	next = &next_p->thread;
>  
> @@ -206,16 +278,21 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
>  
>  		debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
>  		if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP))
>  			debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
>  
>  		update_debugctlmsr(debugctl);
>  	}
>  
> +	if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_NOCPUID) ^
> +	    test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOCPUID)) {
> +		set_cpuid_faulting(test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOCPUID));
> +	}
> +

Why not cache the required MSR value in the task struct instead?

That would allow something much more obvious and much faster, like:

	if (prev_p->thread.misc_features_val != next_p->thread.misc_features_val)
		wrmsrl(MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, next_p->thread.misc_features_val);

(The TIF flag maintenance is still required to get into __switch_to_xtra().)

It would also be easy to extend without extra overhead, should any other feature 
bit be added to the MSR in the future.

Thanks,

	Ingo

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