[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20161213171535.644613179@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 09:16:25 -0800
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.8 24/33] can: raw: raw_setsockopt: limit number of can_filter that can be set
4.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>
commit 332b05ca7a438f857c61a3c21a88489a21532364 upstream.
This patch adds a check to limit the number of can_filters that can be
set via setsockopt on CAN_RAW sockets. Otherwise allocations > MAX_ORDER
are not prevented resulting in a warning.
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/12/2/230
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
include/uapi/linux/can.h | 1 +
net/can/raw.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/include/uapi/linux/can.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/can.h
@@ -196,5 +196,6 @@ struct can_filter {
};
#define CAN_INV_FILTER 0x20000000U /* to be set in can_filter.can_id */
+#define CAN_RAW_FILTER_MAX 512 /* maximum number of can_filter set via setsockopt() */
#endif /* !_UAPI_CAN_H */
--- a/net/can/raw.c
+++ b/net/can/raw.c
@@ -499,6 +499,9 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket
if (optlen % sizeof(struct can_filter) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (optlen > CAN_RAW_FILTER_MAX * sizeof(struct can_filter))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
count = optlen / sizeof(struct can_filter);
if (count > 1) {
Powered by blists - more mailing lists