Message-ID: <43dcc6dc-265b-5eaf-3a70-701e05200b9f@gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 15 Dec 2016 20:41:46 +0100
From:   "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>,
        Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:     mtk.manpages@...il.com, linux-man <linux-man@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: RFC: capabilities(7): notes for kernel developers

Hello Casey,

On 12/15/2016 05:29 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 12/15/2016 3:40 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
>> Hello all,
>>
>> Because the topic every now then comes up "which capability 
>> should I associate with the new feature that I'm adding to 
>> the kernel?", I propose to add the text below to the 
>> capabilities(7) man page [1] with some recommendations
>> on how to go about choosing. I would be happy
>> to get feedback, suggestions for improvement and
>> so on.
> 
> Thank you. This is long overdue.
> 
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Michael
>>
>> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
>>
>>
>>    Notes to kernel developers
>>        When adding a new kernel feature that  should  be  governed  by  a
>>        capability, consider the following points.
>>
>>        *  The  goal of capabilities is divide the power of superuser into
>>           small pieces, such that if a program that has  capabilities  is
> 
> I wouldn't say "small". Small implies many, and we want to
> keep the number of capabilities manageable.

Fixed.

>>           compromised, its power to do damage to the system would be much
>>           less than a similar set-user-ID-root program.
> 
> Not "much less", just less.

Fixed.

> Change "similar set-user-ID-root program" to "the same program
> running with root privilege".

Fixed.

>>        *  You have the choice of either creating  a  new  capability  for
>>           your  new  feature,  or associating the feature with one of the
>>           existing capabilities.  Because the size of capability sets  is
>>           currently  limited to 64 bits, the latter option is preferable,
> 
> The reason is not the size of the set being limited, it is
> that a large set of capabilities would be unmanageable. The
> fact that someone is reading this is sufficient evidence of
> that.

Yep. Reworked to cover this point.

>>           unless there are compelling reasons to take the former option.
>>
>>        *  To determine which existing capability might best be associated
>>           with your new feature, review the list of capabilities above in
>>           order to find a "silo" into which your new feature best fits.
> 
> One approach to take is to determine if there are other features
> requiring capabilities that will always be use along with the
> new feature. If the new feature is useless without these other
> features, you should use the same capability as the other features.

Thanks, I've lifted those words exactly as you gave them into the man page.

>>        *  Don't choose CAP_SYS_ADMIN if you can  possibly  avoid  it!   A
>>           vast  proportion  of  existing capability checks are associated
>>           with this capability, to the point where it  can  plausibly  be
>>           called "the new root".  Don't make the problem worse.  The only
>>           new features that should be associated with  CAP_SYS_ADMIN  are
>>           ones that closely match existing uses in that silo.
> 
> I don't agree with this advice. Use CAP_SYS_ADMIN if you are
> preforming system administration functions. Odds are very good
> that if a program is using one system administration feature
> it will be using others. 

Really? To me, the CAP_SYS_ADMIN situation is a terrible mess.  Around a
third of all of the capability checks in the kernel are for that
capability. Or, to put it another way, it is so broad, that if a process
has to have that capability, it may as well be root.  And because it is
so broad, the number of binaries that might need that file capability is
large. (See also https://lwn.net/Articles/486306/)

Here's an *incomplete* list of (from capabilities(7)) of what
CAP_SYS_ADMIN allows:

  * Perform a range of system administration operations including:
    quotactl(2),   mount(2),   umount(2),  swapon(2),  swapoff(2),
    sethostname(2), and setdomainname(2);
  * perform privileged syslog(2) operations (since  Linux  2.6.37,
    CAP_SYSLOG should be used to permit such operations);
  * perform VM86_REQUEST_IRQ vm86(2) command;
  * perform  IPC_SET and IPC_RMID operations on arbitrary System V
    IPC objects;
  * override RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit;
  * perform operations on trusted and security Extended Attributes
    (see xattr(7));
  * use lookup_dcookie(2);
  * use  ioprio_set(2) to assign IOPRIO_CLASS_RT and (before Linux
    2.6.25) IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE I/O scheduling classes;
  * forge PID when passing  socket  credentials  via  UNIX  domain
    sockets;
  * exceed  /proc/sys/fs/file-max,  the  system-wide  limit on the
    number of open files, in system calls that open  files  (e.g.,
    accept(2), execve(2), open(2), pipe(2));
  * employ  CLONE_* flags that create new namespaces with clone(2)
    and unshare(2) (but, since Linux 3.8, creating user namespaces
    does not require any capability);
  * call perf_event_open(2);
  * access privileged perf event information;
  * call  setns(2)  (requires  CAP_SYS_ADMIN  in the target names‐
    pace);
  * call fanotify_init(2);
  * call bpf(2);
  * perform privileged KEYCTL_CHOWN and  KEYCTL_SETPERM  keyctl(2)
    operations;
  * use ptrace(2) PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER to dump a tracees sec‐
    comp filters;
  * perform madvise(2) MADV_HWPOISON operation;
  * employ the TIOCSTI ioctl(2)  to  insert  characters  into  the
    input  queue of a terminal other than the caller's controlling
    terminal;
  * employ the obsolete nfsservctl(2) system call;
  * employ the obsolete bdflush(2) system call;
  * perform various privileged block-device ioctl(2) operations;
  * perform various privileged filesystem ioctl(2) operations;
  * perform privileged  ioctl(2)  operations  on  the  /dev/random
    device (see random(4));
  * install  a  seccomp(2)  filter without first having to set the
    no_new_privs thread attribute;
  * modify allow/deny rules for device control groups.
  * perform administrative operations on many device drivers.

I'm not sure what subset of that you want to put under "system
administration", but you'd have to be using a very broad definition
indeed to include all of that. (In fact, I think one of the very
problems with the capability is its name. Whereas most capabilities have
task-related names, this one has a role-related name. I think that's not
unconnected to the mess that this capability has become.)
 
So, in summary, I still think it's good advice, though it could perhaps
be more nuanced. (I had attempted to do that with the sentence "The only
new features that should be associated with CAP_SYS_ADMIN are ones that
closely  match existing uses in that silo.") Still, I'm certainly open
to hearing more argument on this point.

>>        *  If  you have determined that it really is necessary to create a
>>           new capability for your feature, avoid making (and  naming)  it
>>           as  a "single-use" capability.
> 
> Be strong. Don't say "avoid making (and naming)", say "don't make or name".
> We can't allow single use capabilities. If we did that we'd have thousands
> of capabilities. It's hard enough to get developers to use a coarse set of
> capabilities.

Good advice re the wording. Thanks. Fixed.

>>   Thus, for example, the addition
>>           of the highly specific CAP_WAKE_ALARM was probably  a  mistake.
>>           Instead,  try  to  identify  and  name your new capability as a
>>           broader silo into which other related future  use  cases  might
>>           fit.
> 
> Need a better example. 

How about CAP_PACCT then?

> CAP_WAKE_ALARM could readily be CAP_TIME.

Actually, I don't quite understand what you mean with that sentence.
Could you elaborate?

By now, the text reads:

   Notes to kernel developers
       When adding a new kernel feature that  should  be  governed  by  a
       capability, consider the following points.

       *  The  goal of capabilities is divide the power of superuser into
          pieces, such that if a program that has one or  more  capabili‐
          ties is compromised, its power to do damage to the system would
          be less than the same program running with root privilege.

       *  You have the choice of either creating  a  new  capability  for
          your  new  feature,  or associating the feature with one of the
          existing capabilities.  In order to keep the set  of  capabili‐
          ties  to  a  manageable  size, the latter option is preferable,
          unless there are compelling reasons to take the former  option.
          (There  is  also a technical limit: the size of capability sets
          is currently limited to 64 bits.)

       *  To determine which existing capability might best be associated
          with your new feature, review the list of capabilities above in
          order to find a "silo" into which your new feature  best  fits.
          One  approach  to  take is to determine if there are other fea‐
          tures requiring capabilities that will always be use along with
          the  new  feature.  If the new feature is useless without these
          other features, you should use the same capability as the other
          features.

       *  Don't  choose  CAP_SYS_ADMIN  if  you can possibly avoid it!  A
          vast proportion of existing capability  checks  are  associated
          with  this  capability,  to the point where it can plausibly be
          called "the new root".  Don't make the problem worse.  The only
          new  features  that should be associated with CAP_SYS_ADMIN are
          ones that closely match existing uses in that silo.

       *  If you have determined that it really is necessary to create  a
          new  capability  for  your  feature, don't make or name it as a
          "single-use" capability.  Thus, for example,  the  addition  of
          the highly specific CAP_PACCT was probably a mistake.  Instead,
          try to identify and name your new capability as a broader  silo
          into which other related future use cases might fit.

Cheers,

Michael

-- 
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/

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