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Message-ID: <CALMp9eQmmr49RQWk384jO05p9wJ1rTv=ZoAJF6Qe8wx-4vcLWA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 08:39:22 -0700
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To: Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@...il.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...mail.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] KVM: VMX: Fix enable VPID conditions
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 5:30 AM, Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@...il.com> wrote:
> From: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...mail.com>
>
> This can be reproduced by running L2 on L1, and disable VPID on L0
> if w/o commit "KVM: nVMX: Fix nested VPID vmx exec control", the L2
> crash as below:
>
> KVM: entry failed, hardware error 0x7
> EAX=00000000 EBX=00000000 ECX=00000000 EDX=000306c3
> ESI=00000000 EDI=00000000 EBP=00000000 ESP=00000000
> EIP=0000fff0 EFL=00000002 [-------] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0
> ES =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
> CS =f000 ffff0000 0000ffff 00009b00
> SS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
> DS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
> FS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
> GS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
> LDT=0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008200
> TR =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008b00
> GDT= 00000000 0000ffff
> IDT= 00000000 0000ffff
> CR0=60000010 CR2=00000000 CR3=00000000 CR4=00000000
> DR0=0000000000000000 DR1=0000000000000000 DR2=0000000000000000 DR3=0000000000000000
> DR6=00000000ffff0ff0 DR7=0000000000000400
> EFER=0000000000000000
>
> Reference SDM 30.3 INVVPID:
>
> Protected Mode Exceptions
> #UD
> - If not in VMX operation.
> - If the logical processor does not support VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=0).
> - If the logical processor supports VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=1) but does
> not support the INVVPID instruction (IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP[32]=0).
>
> So we should check both VPID enable bit in vmx exec control and INVVPID support bit
> in vmx capability MSRs to enable VPID. This patch adds the guarantee to not enable
> VPID if either INVVPID or single-context/all-context invalidation is not exposed in
> vmx capability MSRs.
>
> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...mail.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 9 ++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index 8795a70..8925c76 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -1239,6 +1239,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global(void)
> return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_EXTENT_GLOBAL_CONTEXT_BIT;
> }
>
> +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid(void)
> +{
> + return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_INVVPID_BIT;
> +}
> +
> static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept(void)
> {
> return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
> @@ -6518,8 +6523,10 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX))
> kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX);
>
> - if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid())
> + if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid() || !cpu_has_vmx_invvpid() ||
> + !(cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single() || cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global()))
> enable_vpid = 0;
> +
> if (!cpu_has_vmx_shadow_vmcs())
> enable_shadow_vmcs = 0;
> if (enable_shadow_vmcs)
> --
> 2.7.4
>
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