linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] fscrypt: Add support for AES-128-CBC

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Message-Id: <033D8C72-1F2F-40EF-AD86-A1646EA1A0D6@sigma-star.at>
Date:   Fri, 31 Mar 2017 13:11:59 +0200
From:   David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
To:     Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>
Cc:     tytso@....edu, jaegeuk@...nel.org, dwalter@...ma-star.at,
        Richard Weinberger <richard@...ma-star.at>,
        herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fscrypt: Add support for AES-128-CBC

Hi Eric,

thanks for the feedback!

> On 31.03.2017, at 08:21, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com> wrote:
> 
> [+Cc linux-fscrypt]

Oh, I didn't know about that list. I think MAINTAINERS should be updated to reflect that. :)

> 
> Hi David and Daniel,
> 
> On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 07:38:40PM +0200, David Gstir wrote:
>> From: Daniel Walter <dwalter@...ma-star.at>
>> 
>> fscrypt provides facilities to use different encryption algorithms which are
>> selectable by userspace when setting the encryption policy. Currently, only
>> AES-256-XTS for file contents and AES-256-CBC-CTS for file names are implemented.
>> Which is a clear case of kernel offers the mechanism and userspace selects a
>> policy. Similar to what dm-crypt and ecryptfs have.
>> 
>> This patch adds support for using AES-128-CBC for file contents and
>> AES-128-CBC-CTS for file name encryption. To mitigate watermarking attacks, IVs
>> are generated using the ESSIV algorithm. While AES-CBC is actually slightly
>> less secure than AES-XTS from a security point of view, there is more
>> widespread hardware support. Especially low-powered embedded devices crypto
>> accelerators such as CAAM or CESA support only AES-CBC-128 with an acceptable
>> speed. Using AES-CBC gives us the acceptable performance while still providing
>> a moderate level of security for persistent storage.
>> 
> 
> Thanks for sending this!  I can't object too much to adding AES-CBC-128 if you
> find it useful, though of course AES-256-XTS will remain the recommendation for
> general use.  

Yes, AES-256-XTS should definitely be the recommendation and default here!
AES-128-CBC is a last resort if XTS is not possible for whatever reason.


> And I don't suppose AES-256-CBC is an option for you?

We went for AES-128 since it has less rounds and yields better performance. At least on the hardware we looked at, there was quite a difference in speed between AES-128-CBC and AES-256-CBC.

Anyways, AES-256-CBC could be added with just a few lines after this patch. :)


> Anyway, more comments below:

[...]

>> +	if (ctx.contents_encryption_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC &&
>> +	    ctx.filenames_encryption_mode != FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS)
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
> 
> I think for now we should only allow the two pairs:
> 
> 	contents_encryption_mode=FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS
> 	filenames_encryption_mode=FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS
> 
> and
> 
> 	contents_encryption_mode=FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC
> 	filenames_encryption_mode=FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS
> 
> Other combinations like AES-256-XTS paired with AES-128-CTS should be forbidden.

Yes, I agree.


> This also needs to be enforced in create_encryption_context_from_policy() so
> that FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY fails with bad combinations.
> 
>> +	if (crypt_info->ci_data_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC) {
>> +		/* init ESSIV generator */
>> +		essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
>> +		if (!essiv_tfm || IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
>> +			res = essiv_tfm ? PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm) : -ENOMEM;
>> +			printk(KERN_DEBUG
>> +			       "%s: error %d (inode %u) allocating essiv tfm\n",
>> +			       __func__, res, (unsigned) inode->i_ino);
>> +			goto out;
>> +		}
>> +		/* calc sha of key for essiv generation */
>> +		memset(sha_ws, 0, sizeof(sha_ws));
>> +		sha_init(essiv_key);
>> +		sha_transform(essiv_key, raw_key, sha_ws);
>> +		res = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, (u8 *)essiv_key, keysize);
>> +		if (res)
>> +			goto out;
>> +
>> +		crypt_info->ci_essiv_tfm = essiv_tfm;
>> +	}
> 
> I think the ESSIV hash should be SHA-256 not SHA-1.  SHA-1 is becoming more and
> more obsolete these days.  Another issue with SHA-1 is that it only produces a
> 20 byte hash, which means it couldn't be used if someone ever wanted to add
> AES-256-CBC as another mode.

Good point! We'll change this to always use sha-256.


I'll wait for some more feedback and will provide a v2 which includes all your comments.

Thanks,
David