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Message-ID: <CAEiveUeHk4TkfGbLzomDUB3WB7eV=ts_64BL3SDVvrCKkrPW=Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2017 03:19:55 +0200
From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Dongsu Park <dpark@...teo.net>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com>,
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
belakhdar abdeldjalil <zendyani@...il.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules
autoload restriction
On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 2:12 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 1:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> [...]
>>>> I personally like my implicit_rights idea, and it might be interesting
>>>> to prototype it.
>>>
>>> I don't like blocking a needed feature behind a large super-feature
>>> that doesn't exist yet. We'd be able to refactor this code into using
>>> such a thing in the future, so I'd prefer to move ahead with this
>>> since it would stop actual exploits.
>>
>> I don't think the super-feature is so hard, and I think we should not
>> add the per-task thing the way it's done in this patch. Let's not add
>> per-task things where the best argument for their security is "not
>> sure how it would be exploited".
>
> Actually the XFRM framework CVE-2017-7184 [1] is one real example, of
> course there are others. The exploit was used on a generic distro
> during a security contest that distro is Ubuntu. That distro will
> never provide a module autoloading restriction by default to not harm
> it's users. Consumers or containers/sandboxes then can run their
> confined apps using such facilities.
>
> These bugs will stay in embedded devices that use these generic
> distros for ever.
The DCCP CVE-2017-6074 exploit:
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/503
Well, pretty sure there is more... the bugs are real, as their
exploits. Anyway I think these features can coexist as they are
optional, and most process trees protections can get along by design.
--
tixxdz
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