[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJ99oYmC9hGdtnmdrB3w3ovp=3y2Qfh95z9oDia7JO6KA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 07:29:36 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Arjan van Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task
stack canary
On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 7:04 AM, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-05-04 at 09:32 -0400, Daniel Micay wrote:
>> The stack canary is an unsigned long and should be fully initialized
>> to
>> random data rather than only 32 bits of random data.
>>
>> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>
>>
> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
Thanks! Ingo, should this go via tip?
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists