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Message-ID: <f599b1b6-38b3-71a7-5814-3f7fea7a7038@iaik.tugraz.at>
Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 15:43:28 +0200
From: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@...k.tugraz.at>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
CC: David Gens <david.gens@...tu-darmstadt.de>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Kernel Hardening" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
<clementine.maurice@...k.tugraz.at>, <moritz.lipp@...k.tugraz.at>,
"Michael Schwarz" <michael.schwarz@...k.tugraz.at>,
Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@...dent.tugraz.at>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, <anders.fogh@...ta-adan.de>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map
kernel in user mode
On 08.05.2017 15:22, Mark Rutland wrote:
> Specifically, I think this does not align with the statement in 2.1
> regarding the two TTBRs:
>
> This simplifies privilege checks and does not require any address
> translation for invalid memory accesses and thus no cache lookups.
>
> ... since the use of the TTBRs is orthogonal to privilege checks and/or
> the design of the TLBs.
Ok, this is a good point, we will try to clarify this in the paper.
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