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Message-ID: <07322e2c-e95f-ea35-bc1f-7b05c082e287@gdata-adan.de>
Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 16:44:26 +0200
From: "Fogh, Anders" <anders.fogh@...ta-adan.de>
To: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@...k.tugraz.at>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
"clementine.maurice@...k.tugraz.at"
<clementine.maurice@...k.tugraz.at>,
"moritz.lipp@...k.tugraz.at" <moritz.lipp@...k.tugraz.at>,
Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@...k.tugraz.at>,
Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@...dent.tugraz.at>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not mapkernel in user mode
>> i.e. how does it perform on recent AMD systems?
Sorry for the latency. Recent AMD is reported by Enrique Nissem to not
be vulnerable to the prefetch attack. TSX attack doesn't apply to AMD.
Hund, Willems & Holz wrote in 2013 that AMD was vulnerable to that
attack. The BTB is almost surely working in a different manner of
fashion if at all. So AMD may or may not be vulnerable to the DPF
attack, but none of the modern attacks should work - at least out of the
box.
Best regards,
Anders
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