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Message-ID: <22a14b06-9489-3494-bbb7-428d4e5fa186@nod.at>
Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 16:57:28 +0200
From: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
To: "Fogh, Anders" <anders.fogh@...ta-adan.de>,
Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@...k.tugraz.at>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
"clementine.maurice@...k.tugraz.at"
<clementine.maurice@...k.tugraz.at>,
"moritz.lipp@...k.tugraz.at" <moritz.lipp@...k.tugraz.at>,
Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@...k.tugraz.at>,
Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@...dent.tugraz.at>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not
mapkernel in user mode
Am 09.05.2017 um 16:44 schrieb Fogh, Anders:
>>> i.e. how does it perform on recent AMD systems?
>
> Sorry for the latency. Recent AMD is reported by Enrique Nissem to not
> be vulnerable to the prefetch attack. TSX attack doesn't apply to AMD.
> Hund, Willems & Holz wrote in 2013 that AMD was vulnerable to that
> attack. The BTB is almost surely working in a different manner of
> fashion if at all. So AMD may or may not be vulnerable to the DPF
> attack, but none of the modern attacks should work - at least out of the
> box.
But the promoted patch will also run on AMD systems, that's why I asked
for the overhead.
Thanks,
//richard
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