linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Fix load damaged SSEx MXCSR register

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Message-ID: <d162d9c0-ad45-7cf6-7989-279cdc858323@redhat.com>
Date:   Wed, 10 May 2017 17:34:10 +0200
From:   Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:     Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...mail.com>,
        stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Fix load damaged SSEx MXCSR register


On 10/05/2017 12:19, Wanpeng Li wrote:
> From: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...mail.com>
> 
> Reported by syzkaller:
> 
>    BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc07f6a2e
>    IP: report_bug+0x94/0x120
>    PGD 348e12067 
>    P4D 348e12067 
>    PUD 348e14067 
>    PMD 3cbd84067 
>    PTE 80000003f7e87161
>   
>    Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP
>    CPU: 2 PID: 7091 Comm: kvm_load_guest_ Tainted: G           OE   4.11.0+ #8
>    task: ffff92fdfb525400 task.stack: ffffbda6c3d04000
>    RIP: 0010:report_bug+0x94/0x120
>    RSP: 0018:ffffbda6c3d07b20 EFLAGS: 00010202
>     do_trap+0x156/0x170
>     do_error_trap+0xa3/0x170
>     ? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
>     ? mark_held_locks+0x79/0xa0
>     ? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
>     ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
>     do_invalid_op+0x20/0x30
>     invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
>    RIP: 0010:kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
>     ? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x1c/0x170 [kvm]
>     kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xed6/0x1b70 [kvm]
>     kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
>     ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
>     ? sched_clock+0x13/0x20
>     ? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
>     do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
>     ? up_read+0x1f/0x40
>     ? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
>     SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
>     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2
> 
> SDM mentioned that "The MXCSR has several reserved bits, and attempting to write 
> a 1 to any of these bits will cause a general-protection exception(#GP) to be 
> generated". The syzkaller forks' testcase overrides xsave area w/ random values 
> and steps on the reserved bits of MXCSR register. The damaged MXCSR register 
> values of guest will be restored to SSEx MXCSR register before vmentry. This 
> patch fixes it by catching userspace override MXCSR register reserved bits w/
> random values and bails out immediately.
> 
> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...mail.com>

Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org

Radim should be able to merge it before -rc2.

Thanks!

Paolo

> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 +++++++--
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 464da93..5e9e0e7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -3288,11 +3288,14 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +#define XSAVE_MXCSR_OFFSET 24
> +
>  static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  					struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave)
>  {
>  	u64 xstate_bv =
>  		*(u64 *)&guest_xsave->region[XSAVE_HDR_OFFSET / sizeof(u32)];
> +	u32 mxcsr = *(u32 *)&guest_xsave->region[XSAVE_MXCSR_OFFSET / sizeof(u32)];
>  
>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) {
>  		/*
> @@ -3300,11 +3303,13 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  		 * CPUID leaf 0xD, index 0, EDX:EAX.  This is for compatibility
>  		 * with old userspace.
>  		 */
> -		if (xstate_bv & ~kvm_supported_xcr0())
> +		if (xstate_bv & ~kvm_supported_xcr0() ||
> +			mxcsr & ~vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state.xsave.i387.mxcsr_mask)
>  			return -EINVAL;
>  		load_xsave(vcpu, (u8 *)guest_xsave->region);
>  	} else {
> -		if (xstate_bv & ~XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE)
> +		if (xstate_bv & ~XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE ||
> +			mxcsr & ~vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state.fxsave.mxcsr_mask)
>  			return -EINVAL;
>  		memcpy(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state.fxsave,
>  			guest_xsave->region, sizeof(struct fxregs_state));
>