Date:   Sun, 18 Jun 2017 21:13:28 -0400
From:   Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Masami Ichikawa <masami256@...il.com>,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, lkp@...org,
        xiaolong.ye@...el.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities

On 06/18/2017 06:14 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com):
>> On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>> On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>>>>   If all extended
>>>>>> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>>>>>> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
>>>>>> sure whether that's possible).
>>>>> Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
>>>>> It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea.  Do you have
>>>>> a patch to that effect?  We might even be able to generalize that to
>>>> No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
>>>> The xattr_handler's  take the name of the xattr as input to get().
>>> That may be ok though.  Assume the host created a container with
>>> 100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
>>> uid for root.  If root in the nested container tries to read the
>>> xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
>>> security.foo[100000], then security.foo.  Or, it can do a listxattr
>>> and look for those.  Am I overlooking one?
>>>
>>>> So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
>>> I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
>>> email?  "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>>>
>>>> could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
>>>> time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
>>>> prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
>>> Hm.  Yeah.  But really how many setups are there like that?  I.e. if
>>> you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
>>> bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
>>> copy.  What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
>>> user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
>> I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
>> security.capability:
>>
>> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
> Thanks!
>
>> Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
>> security.foo@...=<uid>
>>
>> 1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the
>> host (init_user_ns).
>> 2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
>> security.capability@...=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of
>> root , e.g. 1000.
>> 3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
>> filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
>> security.capability@...=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
>> 4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
>> 5) security.capability@...=<uid> may be read or written directly
>> from a userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
> This looks very close to what we want.  One exception - we do want
> to support root in a user namespace being able to write
> security.capability@...=<x> where <x> is a valid uid mapped in its
> namespace.  In that case the name should be rewritten to be
> security.capability@...=<y> where y is the unmapped kuid.val.

I'll try to write a patch on top of the existing one.

Can  you adapt your test cases. I haven't tried them, but having them 
would be important.

>
> Eric,
>
> so far my patch hasn't yet hit Linus' tree.  Given that, would you
> mind taking a look and seeing what you think of this approach?  If
> we may decide to go this route, we probably should stop my patch
> from hitting Linus' tree before we have to continue supporting it.
>
> Stefan,
>
> so do you think the general framework could be re-used by IMA?  If
> we can move the capability-specific code in fs/xattr.c into
> an LSM hook in a way that IMA can also use, then this is a definite
> win.

I am fairly sure that this would be easily possible and some of the if 
statements with string comparisons would likely only have to be extended 
with another comparison.

Regards,
    Stefan

>
> -serge
>

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