linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities

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Message-Id: <150d96e7-0cc3-f12e-15f2-6987e571f541@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date:   Mon, 19 Jun 2017 09:05:43 -0400
From:   Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Masami Ichikawa <masami256@...il.com>,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, lkp@...org,
        xiaolong.ye@...el.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities

On 06/18/2017 09:13 PM, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 06/18/2017 06:14 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>> On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>>> On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>>>>>   If all extended
>>>>>>> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>>>>>>> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' 
>>>>>>> (not
>>>>>>> sure whether that's possible).
>>>>>> Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this 
>>>>>> morning.
>>>>>> It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea.  Do 
>>>>>> you have
>>>>>> a patch to that effect?  We might even be able to generalize that to
>>>>> No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
>>>>> The xattr_handler's  take the name of the xattr as input to get().
>>>> That may be ok though.  Assume the host created a container with
>>>> 100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
>>>> uid for root.  If root in the nested container tries to read the
>>>> xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
>>>> security.foo[100000], then security.foo.  Or, it can do a listxattr
>>>> and look for those.  Am I overlooking one?
>>>>
>>>>> So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
>>>> I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
>>>> email?  "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>>>>
>>>>> could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
>>>>> time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
>>>>> prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
>>>> Hm.  Yeah.  But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
>>>> you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
>>>> bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
>>>> copy.  What setups do you know of where multiple containers in 
>>>> different
>>>> user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
>>> I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
>>> security.capability:
>>>
>>> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
>> Thanks!
>>
>>> Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
>>> security.foo@...=<uid>
>>>
>>> 1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the
>>> host (init_user_ns).
>>> 2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
>>> security.capability@...=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of
>>> root , e.g. 1000.
>>> 3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
>>> filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
>>> security.capability@...=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
>>> 4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
>>> 5) security.capability@...=<uid> may be read or written directly
>>> from a userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
>> This looks very close to what we want.  One exception - we do want
>> to support root in a user namespace being able to write
>> security.capability@...=<x> where <x> is a valid uid mapped in its
>> namespace.  In that case the name should be rewritten to be
>> security.capability@...=<y> where y is the unmapped kuid.val.
>
> I'll try to write a patch on top of the existing one.

Did that now in a 2nd patch (that also fixes a few problems of the 1st). 
In a user ns mapped to 1000 root can write security.capability@...=123, 
which then ends up writing to security.capability@...=1123. The reading 
also works with @uid=123. When listing xattrs only those get shown that 
actually have valid mappings.

https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns

    Stefan